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OVERVIEW
Recently, Professors Bebchuk, Kastiel, Tallarita, 1
Strine, 2 Rock, 3 and others have continued the “fundamental
and heated debate about the purpose that corporations
should serve, an increasingly influential ‘stakeholderism’
view.” This advocates giving corporate leaders the
discretionary power to serve all stakeholders and not just
shareholders. 4 Supporters of stakeholderism argue
“. . .address[ing] growing concerns about . . .the impact of
corporations on society and the environment.” 5 Elsewhere,
Professors Roe, Spamann, Fried, and Wang critique the 2020
European Commission report, “Study on directors’ duties
1. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom
Corporate Leaders Bargain, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467 (2021).
2. See Leo Strine, Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play
in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy – A Reply to Professor
Rock, 76 BUS. LAW. 397 (2021).
3. See Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The
Debate over Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. 363 (2021) (Professor Rock observes
that “analytically and conceptually, there are four separate questions being
asked. First, what is the best theory of the legal form we call ‘the corporation’?
Second, how should academic finance understand the properties of the legal form
when building models or engaging in empirical research? Third, what are good
management strategies for building valuable firms? And, finally, what are the
social roles and obligations of large publicly traded firms? I argue that populist
pressures that emerged from the financial crisis, combined with political
dysfunction, have led to the confusion of these different questions, with
regrettable results.”).
4. Bebchuk et al., supra note 1.
5. See id; see also generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Comment, Long-Term
Bias and Director Primacy, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801 (2021); Stephen F.
Diamond, The Myth of Corporate Governance (Jan. 12, 2021), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3742395; Li-Wen Lin, Mandatory Corporate
Social Responsibility Legislation Around the World: Emergent Varieties and
National Experiences, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 429 (2021); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The
False Dichotomy of Corporate Governance Platitudes, 46 J. CORP. L. 345 (2021);
Edward B. Rock, Business Purpose and the Objective of the Corporation (N.Y.U
L. & Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20–44, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3724710; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith &
Reilly S. Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach to
Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Caremark and EESG
Strategy, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1885 (2021).
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and sustainable corporate governance.” 6
On November 9, 2020, six experienced corporate
governance professionals gathered to discuss the duties and
responsibilities of corporate directors and contemporary
challenges, including cyber risk, pandemic, and diversity. 7
Sponsored by the Business Law Association of Prairie View
A&M University, our Article results from that effort and is
augmented with relevant scholarship citations where
appropriate to assist the reader who is interested in more
information. During 2020 and 2021, global governments,
their citizens, and businesses all encountered disruptive
economic and political stress. Particularly in such
challenging times, effective corporate governance is essential
for: business formation, the creation and growth of jobs, and
maintenance of the economic engine that powers economies
and allows for an environment fostering healthy populations
and world peace. During stressful tragedies like the 2020-21
global pandemic, instances of corporate cyberbreach, and
other times of crisis, it is the responsibility of corporate
directors to provide the governance oversight to business
enterprises as they navigate the struggle to preserve jobs
and provide for corporate survival. We believe this Article
6. Mark J. Roe, Holger Spamann, Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, The
Sustainable Corporate Governance Initiative in Europe, 38 YALE J. ON REG. BULL.
133, 133 (2021) (“First, the Report defines the corporate governance problem as
one of pernicious short-termism that damages the environment, the climate, and
stakeholders. But the Report mistakenly conflates time-horizon problems with
externalities and distributional concerns. . . . Second, the Report’s main
ostensible evidence for an increase in corporate short-termism is rising gross
payouts to shareholders (dividends and stock repurchases). However, the more
relevant payout measure to assess corporations’ ability to fund long-term
investment is net payouts. . . . Third, when the Report turns to other evidence for
short-termism, it selectively picks academic studies that support its views on
short-termism, while failing to engage substantial contrary literature. . . .
Finally, the Report touts cures whose effectiveness has little evidentiary support
and, for some, there is real evidence that the cures could be counterproductive
and costly.”).
7. The discussion included within this Article includes the observations of
these experts, based on their many years as corporate directors. The informal
nature of this Article reflects that discussion and their expertise.
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contributes to the literature by highlighting these issues and
helping to bring a healthy discussion to a wider audience.
Our Article proceeds in twelve parts. First, we discuss
the legal duties and responsibilities of corporate directors.
Second, we focus on the demographics of directorship. Third,
we look at required skills and desired experience for
directors. Fourth, we focus on board committees and
structuring the board for efficiency. Fifth, the audit
committee is discussed. Sixth, we describe the function of the
compensation committee. Seventh, the nomination and
governance committee is examined. Eighth, we briefly
discuss the lesser prevalent committees: executive, finance,
risk, investment, technology, compliance, environment,
health, safety, strategy, and other less frequently found
committees. Ninth, we focus on the difficult task of governing
cyber risks. Tenth, we look at the role of directors during
crisis. Eleventh, we discuss the importance of board
diversity. And last, we conclude.
Our Article inevitably fails to resolve the ongoing debate
regarding the full scope of corporate purpose. However, we
believe our comments and observations add to the necessary
and important continuing discussion about the efficient
function of directors as they seek to discharge their duties
and responsibilities, particularly with regard to governing
cybersecurity risk and issues of board diversity.
I.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTORS

A. General
Seasoned director and Professor Seletha Butler explains
that corporations are creatures of state corporate law and
related governing documents. She states that only the board
itself can act on behalf of and bind the corporation, not each
individual director acting independently. Directors are
elected by shareholders. Subject to statutory limitations, the
articles/certificate of incorporation or bylaws establish the
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number of directors to serve the corporation. In accordance
with the governing documents or state law, if direction is
omitted in the governing documents, the established number
of directors can be adjusted in resolutions or meeting
minutes. The term for members of the board of directors
usually is included in the corporate governing documents
(articles/certificate of incorporation or bylaws) and otherwise
follows the rule in the applicable state’s corporation code.
The typical term is one year. Directors of for-profit
corporations typically receive some form of compensation
(cash, stock, options, or a combination) for their service.
Directors hold meetings pursuant to bylaws with
recorded minutes. The governing documents or applicable
corporation code will dictate the percentage needed for
approval or consent to take action. Typically, required
approval is director majority vote, but “big ticket items” or
other extraordinary items (i.e., amendments to articles of
incorporation and certain bylaw provisions or approval of
mergers, acquisitions and dissolution) may require
supermajority approval or consent. Meetings require a
quorum. Special meetings require notice, indicating the time,
place, and reason for the meeting, which can only deal with
that matter. Generally, directors have the following rights:
to inspect the corporate books and records; to compensation;
and to indemnification. Therefore, if a director is sued for
acts as a director, the corporation typically guarantees
indemnification (i.e., reimbursement) or purchases liability
insurance to protect the directors from personal liability for
acts taken. 8 Boards typically establish committees and
allocate board responsibilities to these committees, discussed
in greater detail. 9 Generally, committee meetings require a
quorum, and each director has one vote. In sum, the legal
duties and responsibilities of directors include: duties of
8. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, D&O Insurance:
A Primer, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 337 (2012); JAMES F. MORGAN, BUSINESS LAW 852
(6th ed. 2019) (discussing indemnification and insurance).
9. See infra Part IV.
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loyalty, care, and good faith, and are subject to the “business
judgment rule.” We will now discuss each.
B. Duty of Loyalty
The corporate duty of loyalty is the obligation to
subordinate personal interests to the welfare of the
corporation, which includes: no competition with the
corporation; not engaging in conflict of interest transactions
(unless a majority of the disinterested directors approve the
transaction after full disclosure from the interested director);
no illegal insider trading; no usurpation of corporation
opportunities; and no transaction that is detrimental to the
minority shareholders. 10
C. Duty of Care
At its core, the duty of care is the obligation to act in good
faith and in the best interest of the corporation, which
includes: making an informed and reasonable decision (i.e.,
performing due diligence before making a decision); if
expertise is needed, engage and rely on competent
consultants and experts; exercising reasonable supervision
over officers; and confidentiality. Professor Butler notes “a
dissenting director that has his or her dissent recorded in the
minutes is rarely held liable for breach of duty of care on that
applicable action.” 11
D. Business Judgment Rule
The Business Judgment Rule (BJR) is the principle
pursuant to which a director or officer is immunized from
liability for consequences of a business decision that turns
negative as long as the decision was reasonable, informed,
made in good faith, and in the best interest of the

10. See generally MORGAN, supra note 8, at 849–851, 1021.
11. Id. at 850.
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corporation. The BJR arises from the general view that
informed directors acting in a manner consistent with the
above are better informed and in a superior position to
determine what is in the corporation’s best interest.
Accordingly, only when officers or directors fail to meet the
duty of care or duty of loyalty will they be held personally
liable. 12
II. DIRECTORS: WHO THEY ARE
Corporate directors serve an important and influential
role in our society. Many present or former chief executive
officers are constantly recruited to serve on corporate boards
due to their experience and expertise overseeing business
enterprises. As we will discuss in the following pages, it is
the role of directors to oversee management. To a
considerable extent, the success or failure of corporate
governance will determine the level of job creation and
economic stability—and the ability of society to provide food,
housing, and healthcare to its population. Many of these
governance best practices and legal concepts are also
applicable to directors or trustees serving in a non-profit
setting. 13
A. The Demographics of Directorship
1. Age and Length of Service
During 2020, the average age of directors serving on
Russell 3000 Index companies is 62 years; with the average
age limit for directors reportedly at 74 years-of-age. 14 The

12. Id. at 849; see also H. Justin Pace & Lawrence J. Trautman, Mission
Critical: Caremark, Blue Bell, and Director Responsibility for Cybersecurity
Governance, 2022 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming).
13. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Janet Ford, Nonprofit Governance: The
Basics, 52 AKRON L. REV. 971 (2018).
14. NAT’L ASS’N
(2020).
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National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) reports
that those directors serving as board chair have been on their
company’s board for 13 years and remain in their position as
chair for an average of 8 years. 15 Overall board tenure for
lead directors is twelve years; and, four years of service in
that specific role. 16
2. Skills and Experience
Most boards seek to recruit director candidates with
executive leadership experience in their industry, and former
CEOs are particularly preferred for their experience and
understanding of business. Accordingly, 62 percent of new
directors have an executive leadership background. 17
Because every public company is now required to have an
audit committee composed entirely of independent directors,
and at least one qualified “financial expert” serving on its
audit committee, NACD reports that 40 percent of newly
recruited directors have a “finance” background. 18 Although
results from these earlier surveys do not reflect the impact
from the large number of 2020-21 corporate cyber breaches,
the results disclose that the third most prevalent skill
represented among newly recruited directors is technology at
25 percent. 19
3. Gender
Only about 19 percent of Russell 3000 index company
directors during 2019 are women, up from 15 percent two
years prior. 20 NACD observes, “Most of this growth is
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 9 (2019).
18. Id. (“Finance” is the category used in these surveys, rather than “publiccompany audit” or other, perhaps more accurate and informative term.).
19. Id. (The results do not include an additional 2% of new directors classified
narrowly as “cybersecurity.”).
20. Id. at 5. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Present at the Creation:
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explained by an increasing number of women serving on
boards of mid- and large-cap organizations rather than
small- or mega-cap ones, as mega-cap companies already
tend to have high percentages of women while small-cap
companies have been slow to embrace this trend.” 21 In terms
of new director recruitment, NACD reports that 34 percent
of new directors joining boards are women during 2019, up
from just 26 percent the year prior. 22 Board gender numbers
for 2020 show continued growth in the number of women
directors, as the percentage increases to 21 percent. 23
4. Diversity
The important topic of inadequate board ethnic and
racial diversity is a major focus of this Article and discussed
more fully later. 24 While historical data measuring ethnic
and racial diversity are generally inadequate, NACD reports
that the “percentage of new public-company directors who
are non-Caucasian” increased from 9.7 percent in 2008 to 14
percent in 2018. 25

Reflections on the Early Years of the National Association of Corporate Directors,
17 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1 (2015) (discussing the important function, role, and mission
of the NACD).
21. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 5 (2019). See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Sits on Texas
Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are & What They Do, 16
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 44 (2016).
22. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 9 (2019).
23. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., INSIDE THE PUBLIC COMPANY BOARDROOM 6
(2020). See generally Seletha R. Butler, Business Ethics: Conceptualize Governing
with the Ethic of Care and Justice, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 99 (2015).
24. See infra Part XI.
25. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 9 (2019) (citing Kosmas Papadopoulos, ISS Discusses U.S. Board
Diversity Trends in 2019, COLUM. L. SCH.: THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 20,
2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/06/20/iss-discusses-u-s-boarddiversity-trends-in-2019/). See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Corporate
Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking About This?, 17 SCHOLAR 219
(2015) [hereinafter Trautman, Diversity].
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III. REQUIRED SKILLS AND ORGANIZING FOR EFFICIENCY
Every board must decide what human qualities and
skills are desired as a minimum qualification of every
director.
A. Experience, Talent, and Personal Attributes
As a threshold matter, “[e]ach director candidate should
possess the following necessary core personal attributes:
high standards of ethical behavior, availability, outstanding
achievement in the individual’s personal and professional
life, possession of strong interpersonal and communication
skills, independence, and soundness of judgment.” 26
Professor Trautman states, “High standards of ethical
behavior are an absolute must. The potential cost to the
enterprise . . . due to lapses in personal integrity is a major
reason why, when looking for replacements, boards tend to
find directors who are already well-known to at least one
sitting director.” 27 Unfortunately, as will be discussed more
fully later, this insular prejudice for “people like us” (those
relationships of many years) is likely a major reason for the
slow progress made toward achieving board racial diversity
among U.S. boards. 28
NACD reports, “Most directors (77%) are comfortable
with oversight of current and future talent needs; just 43
percent have reviewed charters to ensure that talent
oversight responsibilities are effectively allocated across the
board. Finally, only 34 percent have set clear expectations
for what the board requires from management.” 29 We have

26. Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for
Director Selection and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75, 82 (2012)
[hereinafter Trautman, Matrix].
27. Id.
28. See infra Part XI.
29. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 5 (2019).

2022]

CORPORATE DIRECTORS

471

stated previously that highly-recruited directors tend to have
executive leadership and finance skills. 30 NACD warns,
“Skills areas that support growing business needs are often
neglected. Skills and backgrounds in areas such as
entrepreneurship, cybersecurity, and human capital were
present in just 2 percent of new directors respectively.” 31 In
addition, this 2019 survey of 500 public-company directors
reveals, “Sixty-one percent of directors report that they
would be willing to compromise on cybersecurity to achieve
business objectives, while 28 percent prioritize cybersecurity
above all else.” 32 As we ponder this data point, the same
directors responded that among a list of 20 “areas for
improvement:” 63% ranked “oversight of strategy execution”
as their highest priority, followed by “oversight of
cybersecurity.” 33 We now turn our attention to a discussion
about board committees.
IV. BOARD COMMITTEES
A. Committee Structure
Corporate directors organize themselves for efficiency,
conducting their work through a committee system. Three
standing committees are found on almost all boards: audit,
compensation, and nomination and governance. Other, less
common, committees found among the Russell 3000 in 2020
include: executive (19%); finance (11%); risk (9%);
investment (4%); technology (6%); compliance (4%);
environment, health, and safety (4%); strategy (2%); and a
series of others (each reported at 1%). 34 We will now look at
30. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18.
31. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 5 (2019).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 35.
34. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., INSIDE
(2020) (Nonstandard Committee Data).

THE
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the more prominent committees.
V. AUDIT COMMITTEE
The audit committee of the board, “will be a standing
committee established to comply with the requirements of
Section 3(a)(58)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 35
as amended. All members of the audit committee must be
independent under the rules of the NYSE and the boards
corporate governance guidelines.” 36 Director Michele Hooper
has chaired audit committees for over 25 years. With
experience on major global boards, she states:
The responsibility for audit committees falls into a couple of
buckets, the most important of which is responsibility for ensuring
that the organization is appropriately addressing the issue of
financial reporting and that the committee has reviewed the
alignment of the company’s audit and audit-financial reporting
structure. Compliance with complex and constantly-changing
regulations and rules as to what the audit committee should be
doing and the audit itself requires both time, expertise and
experience to ensure management’s responsibility for accurate and
complete financial numbers. While the external auditors are
providing assurance, responsibility begins and ends with company
management.

Many issues of financial fraud have arisen over the
years, as evidenced from the failures of Enron, Worldcom,
Adelphia Communications, and many others about twenty
years ago. 37 It was this environment during the early 2000s,
which resulted in public outrage and Congressional action
mandating strengthened changes in how boards addressed

35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk.
36. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 86
(Steven A. Rosenblum, Karessa L. Cain & Sabastian V. Niles eds. 2014),
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/NYSE_Corporate_Governance_Gu
ide.pdf [https://perma.cc/57VQ-6HK3].
37. See Trautman, Matrix, supra note 26, at 84. See generally Robert A.
Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of Section 404, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 703 (2007); Robert A. Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral
Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417 (2003).
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the issue of audit through the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 38 It was
then that boards became even more responsible for assuring
greater accountability by actually signing-off on the accuracy
of financial reports.
The primary focus of a board audit committee is on risk—
in for-profit corporations, nonprofits, and other enterprises
(like educational enterprises ). All of these are large, complex
organizations and challenging for audit committee members
to understand in great detail. This challenge is further
complicated because individual audit committee members
are only on company premises maybe a half a dozen times a
year. By not being there every day, audit committee
members don’t see everything. However, these skilled and
experienced professionals are able to look at risk areas—and
then are able to build assurance structures around these
areas of risk. This is how the audit committee structures its
efforts to understand what needs to be done. As is the case
in all the standing committees, audit committees have an
annual agenda that is aligned to charter responsibilities and
the committee’s annual calendar. With these structures in
place, the committee helps to ensure that all of the
responsibilities required by law are addressed. Audit
committees typically have a structure consisting of perhaps
three or four board members that are assigned to audit.
Audit committee members must deal with the complexity of
information flow from key members of the management
team. Director Ron McCray states:
Particularly since the 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act, 39 the audit
committee has more accountability and there’s a greater
expectation for audit committee performance. To set the tone at the
top, all the highly publicized corporate failures that happened about
2002, birthed the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Many companies got in
trouble because boards of directors and members of senior
management were found ineffective in keeping the corporate ‘train
38. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28
U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
39. See id.
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on the tracks.’ The Sarbanes Oxley Act intends to set a tone at the
top, so that the board holds management to a high set of
accountability and ethics through reporting procedures, like
through hotlines that report fraudulent activity. Oversight of
internal control procedures is also mandated.

An understanding of the year-2000-era history of
corporate failures is particularly important for those living
in and around Houston. The failure of financial fraud by the
Enron Corporation resulted not only in the loss of tens-ofthousands of jobs, but also horrible carnage and suffering
among families in Houston. The failure of Enron also led to
the demise of accounting firm Arthur Andersen, one of the
“big four” major accounting firms at the time. And located
just about 200 miles or so east of Houston was Worldcom,
also a major corporate failure due to financial fraud. Another
example is Adelphia Communications. So, as is the case with
so many things in life, after you have a tremendous societal
failure, legislation gets crafted with a purported solution—
and here we are. And that was the gestation of the Sarbanes
Oxley. Director Ron McCray observes:
If you look at company proxy statements or talk to directors, you
will find that more often than not, the audit committee chair is paid
more than the other directors. One of the reasons for this higher
payment, that might not be so obvious to outsiders, is the
considerable amount of work required by the audit committee. Not
only is the workload regular and constant every quarter, but,
depending on the company and unless there’s a crisis in some other
company area—probably involves a higher workload than that of
the other committees.

Having conducted considerable scholarly research on the
topic of board diversity, director and Professor Seletha
Butler says:
Much of my research about board diversity looks at who is on that
audit committee and the criteria that a financial expert must have
in terms of experience to earn a place of prominence like where
Michele is in her career. Much of my research shows that it is very
difficult for minority directors to be nominated for election. 40 There
40. See generally Seletha R. Butler, “Financial Expert”: A Subtle Blow to the
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just has not been as much traction to have a more diverse slate on
that committee, given the background that minority individuals
tend to have.
Business school and law students should look at future careers
from the standpoint of a trajectory following graduation. My
research shows that opportunities abound for people with a deep
skill set and understanding of finance and accounting. From my
research, many individuals having finance experience occupy these
roles. We’re talking about diversity that also plays into who is
actually occupying that high paying role—and having the ability to
bring these skills to the board as a whole. 41

A. The Financial Expert
At least one audit committee financial expert is required
for every public board and these individuals tend to: be
experienced and knee-deep in audit and have previously
worked as external auditors. 42 Director Michele Hooper
observes:
Before going into board service myself, I used to run businesses—
and therefore, routinely dealt with the management of financial
reporting—and so, along with other relevant experiences, qualify to
be considered an audit committee ‘financial expert,’ which is how I
got selected to serve on a number of audit committees, and also as
an audit committee chair. My preference is to have other auditexperienced directors on my audit committee as well.
Domain expertise is particular important in audit. For example,
when I chaired the audit committee of a major pharmaceutical
company, we had a former chair of the U.S. Food & Drug
Administration (FDA) as an audit committee member, because she
brought a valuable and different perspective, including detailed
understanding of the drug regulation and approval process. By
understanding the audit structure and the underlying numbers,
audit committee members are informed about what the committee
should be doing. There are many ways in which a board begins to
approach this issue of audit and risk assessment. These are very

Pool and Current Pipeline of Women on Corporate Boards, 14 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 1 (2013).
41. See id. at 33.
42. Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial
Expert Under SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J.
205, 221–23 (2013).
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important parts of the board’s responsibilities.

B. Center for Audit Quality
Founded in 2007, the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ),
pursues, “an overarching mission of enhancing investor
confidence and public trust in the global capital markets.” 43
The earlier Sarbanes-Oxley legislation “provided a new
framework of oversight of public company audits through the
establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB), which not only sets standards for public
company auditing firms, but also has inspection and
enforcement authority.” 44 During 2005, the leadership of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
“voted to create the Public Company Auditor’s Forum,
comprised of the AICPA, large audit firms, and public
members. It was envisioned that the Forum would be an
autonomous organization affiliated with the AICPA. . . .
[T]he Forum would be a public policy entity focused
exclusively on public company audits.” 45
Then, “in January 2007, this fledgling organization took
flight as the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) . . . [and]
embarked immediately on a multi-month public dialogue
tour to discuss with a variety of stakeholders potential
improvements to the quality, relevance, and integrity of
financial reporting.” 46 The CAQ has now developed
“resources for its members (public company auditing firms)
and key stakeholders: guides, white papers, alerts, videos,
research reports, investor surveys, and more. All of these
resources remain available free of charge on the CAQ

43. Our History, CTR. FOR AUDIT QUALITY, https://www.thecaq.org/aboutus/our-history/ [https://perma.cc/MC7D-XK68] (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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website.” 47 The CAQ also routinely engages and collaborates
with interested parties (its stakeholders) such as: board
audit committees, the academic community, investors,
internal auditors, and many others.
C. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
A constant problem area for those doing business around
the world is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and
the issues of bribery and corruption. 48 Particularly for law
and accounting students, this is a huge practice problem. In
the business world, before you know it, a business receives
an email or phone call and, for example, it’s the nephew of
the Interior Minister of some country. The business
proposition is that for only $50,000 you too can get an
appointment to talk to the interior minister about those very
valuable oil leases. This is likely the only job the nephew has,
setting up appointments for the uncle, and it appears that
this is how business is conducted in this fictious country.
Exhibit 1 provides a recent example of an FCPA violation.

47. Id.
48. See generally Neal Newman & Lawrence J. Trautman, Securities Law:
Overview and Contemporary Issues, 16 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 149 (2021); Lawrence
J. Trautman, Rapid Technological Change and U.S. Entrepreneurial Risk in
International Markets: Focus on Data Security, Information Privacy, Bribery and
Corruption, 49 CAP. U. L. REV. 67 (2021); Lawrence J. Trautman & Joanna
Kimbell, Bribery and Corruption: The COSO Framework, FCPA, and U.K.
Bribery Act, 30 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191, 193–94 (2018); Lawrence J. Trautman,
Following the Money: Lessons from the “Panama Papers,” Part 1: Tip of the
Iceberg, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 807, 809–10 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman &
George P. Michaely, Jr., The SEC & The Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit,
68 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 262 (2014); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara
Altenbaumer-Price, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Bribery Problem and U.K.
Bribery Act, 47 INT’L LAW. 481, 483–85 (2013); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara
Altenbaumer-Price, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Update on Enforcement
and SEC and DOJ Guidance, 41 SEC. REGUL. L.J. 241, 241–44 (2013); Lawrence
J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Minefield for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145 (2011).
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New Jersey Man Pleads Guilty to Violating the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 49

Thursday, December 17, 2020
NEWARK, N.J. – A New Jersey man today admitted that he paid
a foreign official $100,000 in bribes to secure an improper business
advantage and to obtain and retain business contracts, U.S.
Attorney Craig Carpenito, Acting Assistant Attorney General Brian
C. Rabbitt of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, and
Special Agent in Charge George M. Crouch Jr. of the FBI’s Newark
Field Office announced.
Deck Won Kang, 50, of Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, pleaded
guilty by videoconference before U.S. District Judge Claire C.
Cecchi to an information charging him with violating the antibribery provision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
According to documents filed in the case and statements made in
court:
From January 2009 to February 2013, Kang was a citizen of the
United States, a resident of New Jersey, and an officer, director,
employee, and agent of two closely held New Jersey companies. The
companies obtained and retained contracts with the Defense
Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), which was a stateowned and state-controlled agency within the Republic of Korea’s
Ministry of National Defense. Kang promised a high-ranking
official in the Korean Navy and a procurement official for DAPA
that he would provide him with something of value once he left
public office. Kang made this promise to: (1) to secure an improper
business advantage, specifically obtaining non-public information
about the contracts; (2) aid the companies in obtaining and
retaining the contracts; and (3) to induce the foreign official to use
his influence with the Korean Navy and DAPA to affect and
influence a decision of DAPA concerning the companies obtaining
and retaining the contracts. Kang caused $100,000 to be sent to the
foreign official between April 2012 and February 2013.
The charge of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is
punishable by a maximum potential penalty of five years in prison
and a fine of the greater of $250,000, twice the gross profits to Kang
or twice the gross loss suffered by the victim. Sentencing is
scheduled for April 21, 2021.
U.S. Attorney Carpenito credited special agents of the FBI’s

49. Press Release, U.S. Dept. Justice, New Jersey Man Pleads Guilty to
Violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.justice.
gov/usao-nj/pr/new-jersey-man-admits-violating-foreign-corrupt-practices-act
[https://perma.cc/6ZPB-GW8T].
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Newark Division with the investigation leading to today’s guilty
plea.
The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney
Andrew Kogan of the District of New Jersey and Trial Attorney
Della Sentilles of the Fraud Section of the Department of Justice.
U.S. Attorney Carpenito also thanked the Department of Justice
Office of International Affairs for its assistance with the case.

We can look at the Department of Justice and the SEC
who bring these actions for guidance and numerous
examples of FCPA violations. Most of the prosecutions are of
larger companies like Siemens, which resulted in about a
$1.8 billion fine. Professor Trautman states, “You’ve got to be
selling a lot of product to pay $1.8 billion and still have
something left over. For smaller companies, a Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violation can result in the end
of the enterprise.”
Director Ron McCray states,
Aside from the egregious cases which by definition, oftentimes are
easy, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act can offer traps for the
unwary. When I was an operating and staff executive for FCPA
matters, I thought it very important for companies in my
jurisdiction to have a code of conduct which speaks to the FCPA.
Also important is to have someone from compliance or the legal
department regularly provide instructions to executives who have
exposure to FCPA risk. These regular sessions give employees a
grounding and confidence about how they should think about doing
their jobs and know whom to consult for advice. And if you do that,
you have a chance of somebody not falling into one of these traps for
the unwary.

Director Michele Hooper says:
I would also add that from the board standpoint, one of the things
that I found very important when I chaired audit committees of
global companies, was getting up out of my chair and going to some
of these locations, particularly high-risk international locations. I
found actually being on location to be important, because people
need to see you. They need to hear you. They need to hear you
reinforcing the Ethics and integrity and expectations of the
corporation and quite frankly, have them know that somebody cares
and is watching. And sometimes, just to know that somebody is
watching covers a whole lot of ground. For many corporations, it’s
not so much a focus on the $1.8 billion that a Siemens might pay,
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but it is reputational risk from these areas involving bribery and
corruption. So, it’s really important and very, very substantive for
board members to be engaged.

Exhibit 2 provides, in relevant part, an SEC press
release announcing charges of worldwide bribery and
agreements by Siemens to pay settlement for alleged bribery
payments in excess of $1.4 billion. 50
EXHIBIT 2.

SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in
Worldwide Bribery 51

Washington, D.C., Dec. 15, 2008 — The Securities and Exchange
Commission today announced an unprecedented settlement with
Siemens AG to resolve SEC charges that the Munich, Germanybased manufacturer of industrial and consumer products violated
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by engaging in a
systematic practice of paying bribes to foreign government officials
to obtain business.
The SEC alleges that Siemens paid bribes on such widespread
transactions as the design and construction of metro transit lines in
Venezuela, power plants in Israel, and refineries in Mexico.
Siemens also used bribes to obtain such business as developing
mobile telephone networks in Bangladesh, national identity cards
in Argentina, and medical devices in Vietnam, China, and Russia.
According to the SEC’s complaint, Siemens also paid kickbacks to
Iraqi ministries in connection with sales of power stations and
equipment to Iraq under the United Nations Oil for Food Program.
Siemens earned more than $1.1 billion in profits on these and
several other transactions.
Siemens has agreed to pay $350 million in disgorgement to settle
the SEC’s charges, and a $450 million fine to the U.S. Department
of Justice to settle criminal charges. Siemens also will pay a fine of
approximately $569 million to the Office of the Prosecutor General
in Munich, to whom the company previously paid an approximately
$285 million fine in October 2007. . . .
Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director of the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement, said, “This pattern of bribery by Siemens was
unprecedented in scale and geographic reach. The corruption

50. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide
Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm
[https://perma.cc/4MPD-NL86].
51. Id.
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alleged in the SEC’s complaint involved more than $1.4 billion in
bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle
East, and the Americas. Our success in bringing the company to
justice is a testament to the close, coordinated working relationship
among the SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice, and international
law enforcement, particularly the Office of the Prosecutor General
in Munich.”
Cheryl J. Scarboro, an Associate Director in the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement, said, “The day is past when multi-national
corporations could regard illicit payments to foreign officials as
simply another cost of doing business. The $1.6 billion in combined
sanctions that Siemens will pay in the U.S. and Germany should
make clear that these corrupt business practices will be rooted out
wherever they take place, and the sanctions for them will be
severe.”
The SEC’s complaint alleges that between March 12, 2001, and
Sept. 30, 2007, Siemens created elaborate payment schemes to
conceal the nature of its corrupt payments, and the company’s
inadequate internal controls allowed the conduct to flourish.
Siemens made thousands of payments to third parties in ways that
obscured the purpose for, and the ultimate recipients of, the money.
Employees obtained large amounts of cash from cash desks, which
were sometimes transported in suitcases across international
borders for bribery. The authorizations for payments were placed
on post-it notes and later removed to eradicate any permanent
record. Siemens used numerous slush funds, off-books accounts
maintained at unconsolidated entities, and a system of business
consultants and intermediaries to facilitate the corrupt payments.
Siemens made at least 4,283 payments, totaling approximately $1.4
billion, to bribe government officials in return for business to
Siemens around the world. In addition, Siemens made
approximately 1,185 separate payments to third parties totaling
approximately $391 million, which were not properly controlled and
were used, at least in part, for such illicit purposes as commercial
bribery and embezzlement. . . .

Professional director and law professor Trautman
counsels that “bribery and corruption is a root cause of
medicines not getting to people in the most impoverished
parts of the world as intended. Theft of food supplies
intended for hungry populations result in people not eating.
Accordingly, bribery and corruption may be considered a root
cause of war.” Therefore, the actions of multinational
corporations play a major role impacting global political
stability. Exhibit 3 presents the charter for Microsoft
Corporation’s audit committee.
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Microsoft Corporation Audit Committee
Charter 52

Role
The Audit Committee assists the Board of Directors in fulfilling
its responsibility for oversight of the quality and integrity of the
accounting, auditing, and financial reporting practices of the
Company oversight of the significant business, regulatory, and
compliance risks described in the Audit Committee Responsibilities
Calendar and such other duties as directed by the Board. The
Committee’s purpose is to oversee the accounting and financial
reporting processes of the Company, the audits of the Company’s
financial statements, the qualifications of the public accounting
firm engaged as the Company's independent auditor to prepare or
issue an audit report on the financial statements of the Company
and internal control over financial reporting, and the performance
of the Company's internal audit function and independent auditor.
The Committee reviews and assesses the qualitative aspects of the
Company’s financial reporting to shareholders, the Company’s
financial risk assessment and management, and the Company’s
ethics and compliance programs. The Committee is directly
responsible for the appointment (subject to shareholder
ratification), compensation, retention, and oversight of the
independent auditor. The Committee also reviews and assesses the
Company’s processes to manage and control risk, except for risks
assigned to other committees of the Board or retained by the Board.
Membership
The membership of the Committee consists of at least three
directors, each of whom shall meet the independence requirements
established by the Board and applicable laws, regulations, and
listing requirements. Each member shall in the judgment of the
Board have the ability to read and understand fundamental
financial statements and otherwise meet the financial
sophistication standard established by the requirements of the
NASDAQ Stock Market, LLC. At least one member of the
Committee shall in the judgment of the Board be an “audit
committee financial expert” as defined by the rules and regulations
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Board appoints
the members of the Committee and the chairperson. The Board may
remove any member from the Committee at any time with or

52. MICROSOFT CORP., AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARTER 1–3 (July 1, 2021),
https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https://c.s-microsoft.com/enus/CMSFiles/Audit%20Committee%20Charter%20and%20Responsibilities%20C
alendar.docx?version=7d3463d1-53da-1fc5-f470-b7cf1d06e6dc
[https://perma.cc/67DK-JBQA].
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without cause.
Generally, no member of the Committee may serve on more than
three audit committees of publicly traded companies (including the
Audit Committee of the Company) at the same time. For this
purpose, service on the audit committees of a parent and its
substantially-owned subsidiaries counts as service on a single audit
committee.
Operations
The Committee meets at least eight times a year. Additional
meetings may occur as a majority of the Committee or its chair
deems advisable. The Committee will meet in executive session,
from time to time, without Company management present. The
Committee will cause to be kept adequate minutes of its
proceedings, and will report on its actions and activities at the next
quarterly meeting of the Board. Committee members will be
furnished with copies of the minutes of each meeting and any action
taken by unanimous consent. The Committee is governed by the
same rules regarding meetings (including meetings by conference
telephone or similar communications equipment), action without
meetings, notice, waiver of notice, and quorum and voting
requirements as are applicable to the Board. The Committee is
authorized and empowered to adopt its own rules of procedure not
inconsistent with (a) this Charter, (b) the Bylaws of the Company,
or (c) the laws of the state of Washington.
Communications
The independent auditor reports directly to the Committee. The
Committee is expected to maintain free and open communication
with the independent auditor, the internal auditors, and
management. This communication will include periodic private
executive sessions with each of these parties.
Education
The Company is responsible for providing new members with
appropriate orientation briefings and educational opportunities,
and the full Committee with educational resources related to
accounting principles and procedures, current accounting topics
pertinent to the Company, and other matters as may be requested
by the Committee. The Company will assist the Committee in
maintaining appropriate financial literacy.
Authority
The Committee will have the resources and authority necessary
to discharge its duties and responsibilities. The Committee has
complete authority to retain and terminate outside counsel or other
experts or consultants, as it deems appropriate, including complete
authority to approve their fees and other retention terms. The
Company will provide the Committee with appropriate funding, as
the Committee determines, for the payment of compensation to the
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Company’s independent auditor, outside counsel, and other
advisors as it deems appropriate, and administrative expenses of
the Committee that are necessary or appropriate in carrying out its
duties. In discharging its oversight role, the Committee is
empowered to investigate any matter brought to its attention. The
Committee will have access to the Company’s books, records,
facilities, and personnel. Any communications between the
Committee and legal counsel while obtaining legal advice will be
privileged communications of the Company, and the Committee will
take all necessary steps to preserve the privileged nature of those
communications. The Committee may form and delegate authority
to subcommittees and may delegate authority to one or more
designated members of the Committee.
Responsibilities
The Committee’s specific responsibilities in carrying out its
oversight role are delineated in the Audit Committee
Responsibilities Calendar. The Responsibilities Calendar will be
updated annually as necessary to reflect changes in regulatory
requirements, authoritative guidance, and evolving oversight
practices. The most recently updated Responsibilities Calendar will
be considered to be an addendum to this Charter.
The Committee relies on the expertise and knowledge of
management, the internal auditors, and the independent auditor in
carrying out its oversight responsibilities. Management of the
Company is responsible for determining the Company’s financial
statements are complete, accurate, and in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) and establishing
satisfactory internal control over financial reporting. The
independent auditor is responsible for auditing the Company’s
financial statements and the effectiveness of the Company’s
internal control over financial reporting. It is not the duty of the
Committee to plan or conduct audits, to determine that the financial
statements are complete and accurate and in accordance with
GAAP, to conduct investigations, to assure compliance with laws
and regulations or the Company’s standards of business conduct,
codes of ethics, internal policies, procedures, and controls, or to
manage and control risks to which the Company may be exposed.

We now turn our attention to the role and operation of
the compensation committee.
VI. COMPENSATION COMMITTEE
The NACD discloses that Compensation Committee
chairpersons of Russell 3000 Index companies have tenure of
10 years on the board, and 4 years specifically in the role as

2022]

CORPORATE DIRECTORS

485

chair. 53 Ron McCray states:
The compensation committee is responsible for seeing that the
executives get paid; normally accomplished by having the
compensation committee, usually with the help of a consultant;
determine how comparable companies are compensating their
executives. This is important because one of the great risks, in every
company, is the risk of loss of best employees if they are being
under-paid and ensuring key executives are not being paid less than
those executives at competing enterprises. It’s just a matter of
fairness—but beyond the issue of comparability, there is the issue
of incentives. Most top-level officers have the primary leadership
leverage in the success of the organization. Therefore, incentives to
develop and implement the strategies and tactics with the support
of the board to enhance stakeholder value is vital to the future
success of the enterprise.

Compensation is designed so that it appropriately
rewards success and allows executives to share in the
rewards with shareholders. The benefit of any such
performance increase will yield a value that accrues from
their efforts, such that most executive packages will have a
short-term bonus compensation, which will relate to
measurable performance over a given time-period, probably
a year. Then, long term compensation, which will normally
be in the form of some form of equity often is employed. This
schematic is used in order to align and incentivize the
executives with the strategy that the Board and
Management has agreed to and seeing that it is executed
according to the agreed-upon plan. Most compensation
committees for many companies are directly linked to
executive talent development because these executives are so
critical to the successful implementation of corporate
strategy, management of risk, and so forth. The
compensation committee oftentimes serves as a
Management Development Committee and therefore has
some visibility into the next line of management, certainly
the successor to the CEO, but even beyond that because the

53. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 13 (2019).
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board has an interest in having a long-term solid
stewardship of the company.
Michele Hooper observes, “One of the basic things that
the compensation committee does at the outset is to develop
a pay philosophy . . . and this will serve as a guide to pay
decisions of the activities within a board.” Director Hooper
continues:
It’s how you pay your employees; how you as an organization,
think about pay and it could be that you want to align your
compensation with a certain stewardship responsibility and an
incentive to make sure that your executives have a stewardship
approach about how they execute their duties. This is a way of
thinking about how the company wants to align itself from an
incentive standpoint, with your peers. Most organizations consider
it good practice to write down their pay philosophy statement so
that both employees and the board understand exactly what they
want to do and how they want to do it. This human capital
management development has just begun to be expanded as we
have gone into the area of environmental, social and governance
(ESG) issues. 54 We’re finding now that Human Capital is getting to
be an increasing part of compensation and these functional areas
are actually changing their names to ‘compensation and human
capital management.’ So, you’re beginning to see a much higher
focus on this particular area of the enterprise.

Director McCray adds, “When incentive pay is
structured as an incentive for key executives to stay and a
hefty pay package does not work out, particularly in the case
of malfeasance, a relatively recent tool that companies are
using that offers a tool to avoid the moral hazard dilemma is
pay clawbacks.” Exhibit 4 presents the charter for Cisco
System’s Compensation and Management Development
Committee.

54. Lawrence J. Trautman & Neal F. Newman, The Environmental, Social,
and Governance (ESG) Debate Emerges from the Soil of Climate Denial, 53 U.
MEM. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3939898.
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Cisco System’s Compensation and
Management Development Committee
Charter 55

1. Purpose
The Compensation and Management Development Committee’s
(the “Committee”) basic responsibility is to review the performance
and development of the Company’s management in achieving
corporate goals and objectives and to assure that the Company’s
executive officers (as defined below) are compensated effectively in
a manner consistent with the strategy of the Company, competitive
practice, sound corporate governance principles and stockholder
interests. Toward that end, the Committee will review and approve
all compensation to executive officers.
2. Composition of the Committee
The Committee will consist of not less than two directors, each of
whom will be an “independent director” as required by the rules of
The Nasdaq Stock Market (“Nasdaq”), including the additional
independence requirements specific to compensation committee
membership, and a “non-employee director” within the meaning of
Rule 16b-3 issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”). Each appointed Committee member will be subject to
annual reconfirmation and may be removed by the Board of
Directors (the “Board”) at any time.
3. Responsibilities and Duties
In carrying out its purpose, the Committee will have the following
responsibilities and duties:
Review annually and approve the Company’s compensation
strategy to ensure that it promotes stockholder interests and
supports the Company’s strategic and tactical objectives, and that
it provides appropriate rewards and incentives for management and
employees of the Company, including review of compensationrelated risk management.
Review annually and approve corporate goals and objectives
relevant to executive compensation and evaluate performance in
light of those goals.
Review annually and determine the individual elements of total
compensation for the Chief Executive Officer and during such
voting and deliberations the Chief Executive Officer will not be

55. CISCO SYS., INC., COMPENSATION AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
COMMITTEE CHARTER (Aug. 5, 2021), https://s2.q4cdn.com/951347115/files/
doc_downloads/2021/08/Compensation-Committee-Charter-August-2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E36Q-BTTN].
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present.
Review annually and determine the individual elements of total
compensation for all other “executive officers” within the meaning
of Rule 3b-7 issued by the SEC and “officers” within the meaning of
Rule 16a-1(f) issued by the SEC (together with the Chief Executive
Officer, the “Officers”).
Review and discuss the “Compensation Discussion and Analysis”
disclosure prepared pursuant to the requirements of Item 402(b) of
Regulation S-K (or any successor disclosure item), and based on
such review and discussion recommend to the Board whether such
“Compensation Discussion and Analysis” disclosure should be
included in the Company’s annual report on Form 10-K, proxy
statement, information statement or similar document.
Communicate in the annual Board Compensation Committee
Report to stockholders the disclosures required by Item 407(e)(5) of
Regulation S-K (or any successor disclosure item).
Approve any special perquisites, special cash payments and other
special compensation and benefit arrangements for the Company’s
Officers.
With sole and exclusive authority, make and approve equity
grants and other discretionary awards under the Company’s equity
incentive plans to all persons who are Officers.
Grant equity awards and other discretionary awards under the
Company’s equity incentive plans to all other eligible individuals in
the Company’s service.
Amend the provisions of the Company’s equity incentive plans,
to the extent authorized by the Board, and make recommendations
to the Board with respect to incentive compensation and equitybased plans.
Approve for submission to the stockholders equity incentive plans
or amendments thereto.
Provide general oversight of the Company’s employee benefit
plans. Responsibility for day-to-day administration of the employee
benefit plans and the investment of any assets, including the
preparation and filing of all government reports and the
preparation and delivery of all required employee materials and
communications, will be the sole responsibility of Company
personnel.
Ensure that incentive compensation plans are administered in a
manner consistent with the Company’s compensation strategy and
the terms of such plan, including but not limited to the following:
participation, target annual incentive awards, corporate financial
goals, and actual awards paid to Officers.
Review matters related to management performance,
compensation and succession planning (including periodic review
and approval of Chief Executive Officer and other Officer succession
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planning) and executive development for executive staff.
Oversee and review the development and implementation of the
Company’s practices, strategies, and policies used for recruiting,
managing, and developing employees (i.e., human capital
management). These practices, strategies, and policies focus on
diversity and inclusion, workplace environment and safety, and
corporate culture. Discuss with management, as appropriate, their
progress regarding such practices, strategies, and policies.
Approve separation packages and severance benefits for Officers.
Exercise, as necessary and appropriate, the authority of the
Board with respect to the election of corporate officers of the
Company during the periods between the regular meetings of the
Board.
Have full access to the Company’s executives and personnel as
necessary to carry out its responsibilities.
Obtain such advice, data or other resources necessary to perform
its duties hereunder, and the Committee has the authority to obtain
external consultant reports or published salary surveys, and in its
sole discretion may retain or obtain the advice of a compensation
consultant, legal counsel or other advisors to assist it in connection
with its functions hereunder. If the Committee retains the services
of a compensation consultant, legal counsel or other advisor to
assist it in connection with its functions, the Committee shall be
directly responsible for the appointment, compensation and
oversight of the work of any such advisor. The Company shall
provide appropriate funding, as determined by the Committee, for
payment of reasonable compensation to such advisors. Selection of,
or receipt of advice from, any compensation consultant, legal
counsel or other advisor shall be made only after the Committee
takes into consideration factors relevant to that advisor’s
independence, including all factors specified by the rules of Nasdaq
(including Nasdaq Rule 5605(d)(3)(D)).
Review and approve all reports and summaries of Officer
compensation policies and decisions as may be appropriate for
operational purposes or as may be required under applicable law.
Perform any other activities consistent with this Charter, the
Company’s Bylaws and governing law as the Committee or the
Board deems necessary or appropriate.
Review at least annually the Committee Charter for adequacy
and recommend any changes to the Board.
Report to the Board on the major items covered at each
Committee meeting.
4. Committee Meetings
The Committee will meet as often as necessary to carry out its
responsibilities. Meetings may be called by the Chair of the
Committee and/or by the management of the Company. Minutes of
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each meeting will be duly filed in the Company records. Reports of
meetings of the Committee will be made to the Board at its next
regularly scheduled meeting following the Committee meeting
accompanied by any recommendations to the Board approved by the
Committee.
The Committee will also meet as necessary to act upon any other
matters within its jurisdiction under this Charter. A majority of the
total number of members of the Committee will constitute a quorum
at all Committee meetings. Minutes will be kept of each meeting of
the Committee.

VII. NOMINATION AND GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE
A survey conducted by the NACD discloses that the
Nomination and Governance (Nom-Gov) Committee
chairpersons of Russell 3000 Index companies have tenure of
10 years on the board, and 4 years specifically in the role as
chair. 56Director Michele Hooper says:
A nominating and governance committee is responsible for two
things: first, nomination for election by the shareholders of the
individuals that are coming onto the board; and second, defining
and understanding what the principles of governance are within the
board as well as within the organization. So, things like the ethics
and integrity statements are the purview of this committee, making
sure that objectives are in alignment. From the nominating and
governance standpoint, most corporations have somewhere
between seven and twelve directors, depending on the size of the
corporation. It is important to have a mix of skills and experiences
because you want to make sure that you’ve got enough individuals
on your board to really help understand the direction of the longterm sustainability and strategy of the company. Therefore, just
like in a normal hiring process, the goal is to bring people onto the
board that can help the company go to the next level. Accordingly,
most organizations use something called a skills and experience
matrix.
This matrix analysis is something that the National Association
of Corporate Directors (NACD) has really focused upon and has
driven a strong focus and approach of nominating and governance
committees to create a matrix. You ask, “What are the skills that
we need to assure the long-term sustainability and strategy for the
organization?” Then you compare these desired skills against who

56. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 13 (2019).
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is currently on our board, their skills, and experience. Examining
where current directors fit into this matrix helps to ensure the
desired skills like required financial expertise for audit committees
is present, along with younger directors whom will develop
institutional memory over time. Other industry-specific skills and
experience may also be at a premium. For example, at one of my
boards, which is a healthcare board, we recognized the necessity to
have healthcare experience. Common areas of experience required
in other companies might include consumer marketing or brand
marketing or somebody having cyber risk expertise. Both skills and
experience are necessary.
All these considerations involve issues of diversity. Either
geographic, age, ethnicity, gender, or race—and an attempt is made
to align those skills with your company’s long-term strategy and
experiences. Then, the committee begins to use that matrix. The
challenge becomes: we have x number of positions open and we want
to find somebody with those skill sets and experience to fit.
Hopefully, we conduct a gender- and race-blind assessment of
candidates and recruit the optimal mix of people for available board
positions. Part of the challenge we have is that in the past boards
have tended to fish in the same ponds and so those same ponds get
us the same people and those same people tended to be older white
guys.
However, during 2020, what we’re finding is that through a lot of
hard work and through the unfortunate tragedy of the George
Floyd’s murder, boards are opening their eyes to the fact that many
very talented and experienced individuals of Color possess the
requisite skills and experience to make excellent directors. Quite
frankly, this is a view that is relatively new in the United States.
Americans have not focused on this expanded field of vision to
produce minorities as viable director candidates. What’s happening
is not necessarily a gender issue, because we seem to have been
focused during the last ten years on bringing women onto boards.
And while many great women have been recruited, they tend to be
white women. Now, recognizing there’s a lot of minorities and
people of Color who are qualified, let’s open our aperture. Let’s
begin to look at people and bring on these additional talents that
are available. Slowly, we’re finding them and it’s really a wonderful
thing. 57

Director and University President Ruth Simmons states:
From my experience, the nominating and governance committee
at most places actually devotes a relatively small amount of time
57. See infra Part XI.
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searching for directors, most of their work goes to governance. Many
internal issues within companies get in the way of making progress
in director diversity recruitment. Most CEOs are typically wrestling
with numerous issues within the company that can span a range of
types of issues, dominating time and focus. And for the most part,
the CEO and the lead director, if there is one, and the board will
lean on the governance committee to solve those issues. Sometimes,
there can be issues with the performance of directors; there can be
issues with working out the logical structure of decision making.
There can be issues of taking a particular kind of action that the
governance committee needs to recommend to the board.
So, I think of a governance committee as being the committee
employed when companies get into trouble. During these times, you
don’t call on compensation, you don’t call on audit. You don’t call on
any other committee to solve a broken company so much as you call
on governance to do it because governance tends to serve a rescue
function—because, inevitably, what is falling down in a company
when it fails is an inattention to fundamentals of governance. So, I
remember when I was chair of the governance committee at a large
multinational company, we had a director who was disrupting every
meeting. It became impossible for us to hold meetings because he
was so disruptive. He had particular issues that he cared about.
And so I was called on as chair of the governance committee to tell
him that he needed to resign. So, the nom-gov committee is more or
less a kind of ‘fix it’ committee, and this is not the only circumstance
in which I had as chair of governance to do something like that. So,
I regard governance as one of the very key committees of every
board. And the search for directors is an ongoing thing. And we’re
fishing in the same pond, because we’re using the same search firms
principally. And these search firms are circulating the same names
to all the companies and so on. So, governance and nomination
committees tend to have a standing order to look for directors and
that just goes on all the time. Throughout the year the nomination
and governance committee is paying attention to the talent that’s
available, but often there isn’t room on the board for another
director. However, boards are often waiting for an opening, which
may or may not occur near term. Following nomination, directors
are elected by shareholders. Then, in order to be reappointed,
directors have to be included on a proxy statement and be elected
by shareholders.

Exhibit 5 presents the charter for General Motor’s
Governance and Corporate Responsibility Committee
Charter.
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General Motors Company Governance and
Corporate Responsibility Committee Charter 58

Purpose
The purpose of the Governance and Corporate Responsibility
Committee of the Board of Directors of General Motors Company is
to assist the Board in its oversight of the Company’s governance
structures, programs and policies by:
•Identifying individuals qualified to serve as members of the
Board and, where appropriate, recommend individuals to be
nominated by the Board for election by the shareholders or to be
appointed by the Board to fill vacancies consistent with the
criteria approved by the Board;
•Developing and recommending to the Board a set of corporate
governance guidelines and other corporate governance policies
and otherwise performing a leadership role in shaping the
Company’s corporate governance;
•Overseeing an annual evaluation of the performance of the
Board and its standing committees; recommending to the Board
the compensation of directors;
•Ensuring the Company has proper governance over
environmental and social initiatives, strategies, and policies
related to sustainability and corporate responsibility;
•Overseeing the Company’s public policy priorities, including its
U.S. political contributions and lobbying activities; and
•Performing such other duties and responsibilities requested by
the Board or enumerated in and consistent with this Charter.
Membership
The Committee shall be composed of no fewer than three
independent members, and the Committee’s composition shall
satisfy the Listing Standards of the New York Stock Exchange
relating
to
nominating/corporate
governance
committee
membership and such other requirements as shall be provided in
the Company’s Bylaws or as the Board shall otherwise determine.
The members of the Committee and the Committee Chair shall be
appointed, and may be replaced, by the Board upon consideration
of the recommendations of the Committee; provided, however, that
all members of the Committee shall be independent directors. The
Committee members and the Committee Chair shall serve until
they are replaced, they resign or their successors are duly elected

58. GEN. MOTORS CORP., GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
COMMITTEE CHARTER (Aug. 17, 2021), https://investor.gm.com/static-files/094ef3c
0-3ea0-4837-9976-fc025d5b8f5d [https://perma.cc/GW2N-REL8].
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and qualified.
Meetings
The Committee shall meet as often as may be deemed necessary
or appropriate. Attendance by one-third of the directors serving on
the Committee, but not less than two members, shall constitute a
quorum for the transaction of business. Except as otherwise desired
by the Committee Chair, the Chair of the Board and Lead Director,
if elected, shall be invited to every meeting and other directors who
are not members of the Committee may attend meetings, but such
non-Committee members shall have no voting rights. The
Committee Chair may ask members of management or others to
attend all or any portion of any meeting or to provide relevant
information in written form. The Committee shall regularly meet in
executive session absent GM management.
The Committee Chair shall be responsible for scheduling all
meetings of the Committee and providing the Committee with a
written agenda for each meeting. The Committee Chair shall
preside at the meetings of the Committee. In the absence of the
Committee Chair, the majority of the members of the Committee
present at the meeting shall appoint a member to preside at the
meeting. The Committee Chair shall report to the full Board
regularly following each meeting and make such recommendations
to the Board as the Committee deems appropriate. The Committee
may adopt such other rules and regulations for calling and holding
its meetings and for the transaction of business at such meetings as
is necessary or desirable and not inconsistent with the provisions of
the Company’s Bylaws or this Charter.
Responsibilities and Duties
The Committee shall be responsible for matters related to service
on the GM Board and associated issues of governance and corporate
responsibility. To fulfill its responsibilities, the Committee shall:
Board and Committee Composition
•From time to time, conduct studies of the size and composition
of the Board and review with the Board the criteria for Board
membership.
•Prior to recommending an incumbent, replacement or
additional director, review his or her qualifications, including
individual
performance
and
contributions,
capability,
availability to serve, conflicts of interest, and other relevant
factors, such as environmental, social, or governance (“ESG”)
expertise. In fulfilling the Committee’s responsibilities for
recommending individuals for nomination for election to the
Board, the Committee will apply the Board Membership Criteria
outlined in the Board’s Corporate Governance Guidelines and
will review related party transactions and other matters that
may have a bearing on the individual’s independence or
otherwise affect their suitability for membership on the Board.

2022]

CORPORATE DIRECTORS

495

•Prior to each Annual Meeting of Shareholders, recommend to
the Board the individuals to constitute the nominees of the
Board, for whom the Board will solicit proxies. In the interim
between annual meetings, recommend to the Board candidates to
be elected directors by the Board. Review and consider
shareholder recommended candidates for nomination to the
Board.
•Oversee the orientation process for new directors and advise
non-employee directors on suggestions for their continuing
education.
•Annually review and make recommendations to the Board as to
the compensation of nonemployee directors.
•Make recommendations annually to the Board as to the
independence of directors as defined by GM’s Bylaws and the
requirements set forth by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the NYSE, and other applicable regulatory
authorities.
•Annually review and after taking into consideration the
preferences of individual directors and the needs of the Company,
make recommendations to the Board as to the membership,
including the Chair, of each standing committee.
•Annually review the qualifications of the independent members
of the Board to serve as Lead Director and make a
recommendation to the independent directors as to the election
of the Lead Director, if the CEO also serves as Chair.
•Consider and make recommendations to the Board with respect
to any resignation tendered by a director pursuant to the Board’s
Corporate Governance Guidelines and GM’s Bylaws.
Governance and Performance
•Periodically review and recommend to the Board revisions, as
appropriate, to the Company’s corporate governance framework,
including its Certificate of Incorporation, Bylaws and Corporate
Governance Guidelines.
•Monitor the Company’s compliance with the Corporate
Governance Guidelines.
•Establish and administer an annual assessment process
relating to the performance of the Board and its committees and
review annually the overall effectiveness of the Board
recommending improvements where warranted.
Sustainability, and Corporate Responsibility
•Oversee the Company’s development of ESG initiatives,
strategies, policies, and practices related to matters of
sustainability and corporate responsibility that may have a
material impact on the Company.
•Annually review the Company’s human rights practices,
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including responsible sourcing practices within the Company’s
supply chain.
•Review the Company's policies and practices related to
corporate philanthropy globally; specifically, the support of
charitable, educational, and social organizations.
•Review for approval, in consultation with the Audit Committee,
the Sustainability Report.
Other Corporate Policies
•Review policy and requests to serve on outside for-profit boards
for all GM employees designated by the Board as executive
officers.
•Review transactions subject to the Company’s Related Party
Transactions Policy.
•Review and submit to the Board proposed revisions to the
Board’s Delegation of Authority.
•Review and approve revisions to executive officers’ security and
air travel policies. Annually review such officers’ compliance with
the Company’s policies regarding private or charter aircraft
usage.
•Review the Company’s U.S. policies and practices related to
political and campaign contributions, contributions to trade
associations and other tax-exempt and similar organizations that
may engage in political activity, lobbying activities, and reports
on the Company’s political spending and related audits.
Procedurally, corporate political spending is reviewed and
approved by senior management. Management oversight for
political activity resides with the highest-ranking public policy
executive of the Company.
Other Matters
•Review director stock ownership and holding requirements.
•Review and provide guidance to the Board and management
about the framework for the Board’s oversight of and
involvement in shareholder engagement, and annually reviews
shareholder sentiment and feedback, including on ESG.
•Review and make recommendations to the Board on
shareholder proposals submitted for inclusion in the Company’s
proxy materials, which relate to governance, corporate
responsibility, sustainability or political spending issues.
•Have and exercise such other powers, authority and
responsibilities as may be determined by the Board.
Other Responsibilities and Charter Amendments
The Committee shall perform such other task or functions as may
be delegated to or requested of the Committee by the Board. The
Committee shall review annually its performance (including its

2022]

CORPORATE DIRECTORS

497

effectiveness and compliance with this Charter). Amendments to
this Charter must be approved by the Board.
Committee Authority
The Committee shall have the authority to undertake any other
action or exercise such other powers, authority and responsibilities
as the Committee determines necessary or appropriate to the
discharge of the responsibilities and duties set forth in this Charter
or the Company’s Bylaws, or otherwise required by the Listing
Standards of the New York Stock Exchange or other applicable
laws, rules or regulations, or as shall otherwise be determined by
the Board.
The Committee shall have full access to the books, records,
facilities and personnel of the Company. The Committee may, at the
Company’s expense, obtain advice, assistance, and investigative
support from outside advisors as it deems appropriate to perform
its duties. The Committee shall have the sole authority to select,
retain, compensate and terminate, set retention terms and approve
the fees of any search firm used to identify director candidates or
outside legal counsel or other advisors.
Subject to applicable laws, regulations or rules, or the Company’s
Bylaws, the Committee may delegate authority to members of
management and also form and delegate authority to
subcommittees consisting of one or more members, when it deems
appropriate. In so delegating authority, the Committee shall not
absolve itself from the responsibilities it bears under the terms of
this Charter.

VIII. LESS PREVALENT COMMITTEES
Having discussed the three standing committees found
on almost all boards: audit, compensation, and nomination,
and governance, we now turn our attention to the other, less
common committees found among the Russell 3000 during
2020 including: executive (19%); finance (11%); risk (9%);
investment (4%); technology (6%); compliance (4%);
environment, health, and safety (4%); strategy (2%) and
others (each reported at 1%). 59

59. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., INSIDE THE PUBLIC COMPANY BOARDROOM
25 (2020) (Nonstandard Committee Data).
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A. Executive Committee
Executive committees exist primarily “to perform and
exercise the powers of the board to direct the business and
affairs of the company between meetings of the board. In
some organizations, composition of this committee might
consist of the chairman of the board and chairpersons of the
standing committees.” 60 Because the function of this
committee is to conduct the board’s business when a task
needs to be performed and not enough time exists to call the
board together, availability on short notice will be an
important consideration for membership on this committee.
B. Finance Committee
NACD reports that eleven percent of Russell 3000 Index
companies had finance committees during 2020, up from ten
percent the year prior. 61 Finance committees monitor the
organization’s capital structure and govern management’s
efforts to achieve optimal finance of the enterprise. 62 Exhibit
6 presents the Charter of the Finance Committee for Ford
Motor Company.

60. See Trautman, Matrix, supra note 26, at 95.
61. NAT’L ASS’N
(2020).

OF

CORP. DIRS., INSIDE

THE

PUBLIC COMPANY BOARDROOM 10

62. See Neal F. Newman & Lawrence J. Trautman, Special Purpose
Acquisition Companies (SPACs) and the SEC, 24 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3905372 (discussing recent
developments in corporate capital formation).
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Charter of the Finance Committee of the
Board of Directors Ford Motor Company 63

I. Purpose
The Finance Committee shall provide assistance to the Board of
Directors of the Company in fulfilling its responsibility to the
shareholders in respect of the policies, practices, and strategies that
relate to the management of the financial affairs of the Company.
The Finance Committee also shall perform such other functions and
exercise such other powers as may be delegated to it from time to
time by the Board of Directors. The Finance Committee’s primary
purpose is to:
•Review management’s plans to manage the Company’s
exposure to financial risk.
•Review the Company’s cash plan, balance sheet, and capital
structure.
•Review the Company’s capital allocation strategy, including the
cost of capital.
•Recommend dividend actions to the Board of Directors.
•Review the Company’s pension strategy and performance and
health care costs and funding.
II. Structure and Operations
Composition and Qualifications
The Finance Committee shall be comprised of three or more
directors as determined by the Board (upon the recommendation of
the Nominating and Governance Committee), each of whom shall
be determined by the Board of Directors to possess financial
acumen. All members of the Finance Committee shall have a
working familiarity with basic finance practices, and at least one
member of the Finance Committee shall have financial
management expertise.
Appointment and Removal
The members of the Finance Committee shall be designated by
the Board annually and shall serve until their successors shall be
duly designated or until such member’s earlier resignation or
removal. Any member of the Finance Committee may be removed
from the Committee, with or without cause, by a majority vote of
the Board. Unless a Chair is designated by the full Board, the

63. FORD MOTOR CO., CHARTER OF THE FINANCE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS (Dec. 2012), https://corporate.ford.com/content/dam/corporate/us/enus/documents/governance-and-policies/company-governance-finance-charter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VK5M-VZKE].
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members of the Finance Committee shall designate a Chair by
majority vote of the full Finance Committee membership. The Chair
will chair all regular sessions of the Finance Committee and set
agendas for Finance Committee meetings.
Delegation to Subcommittees
In fulfilling its responsibilities, the Finance Committee shall be
entitled to delegate any or all of its responsibilities to a
subcommittee of the Finance Committee and, to the extent not
expressly reserved to the Finance Committee by the Board or by
applicable law, rule or regulation, to any other committee of 2
directors of the Company appointed by it, which may or may not be
composed of members of the Finance Committee.
III. Meetings
The Finance Committee shall ordinarily meet at least four times
annually, or more frequently as circumstances dictate. Any director
of the Company who is not a member of the Finance Committee may
attend meetings of the Finance Committee; provided, however, that
any director who is not a member of the Finance Committee may
not vote on any matter coming before the Finance Committee for a
vote. The Finance Committee also may invite to its meetings any
member of management of the Company and such other persons as
it deems appropriate in order to carry out its responsibilities. The
Finance Committee may meet in executive session, as the Finance
Committee deems necessary or appropriate.
IV. Responsibilities and Duties
To fulfill its responsibilities and duties, the Finance Committee
shall:
Documents/Reports Review
Capital Strategy
(1) Review and make recommendations to the Board with respect
to the Company’s capital structure, including the registration,
issuance, and redemption of Company equity securities, and
material changes thereto.
(2) Recommend to the Board of Directors dividends to
shareholders and other shareholder actions.
(3) Review capital allocation priorities, policies and guidelines,
including the Company’s cash flow, minimum cash requirements,
and liquidity targets.
(4) Review Ford Motor Credit Company’s capital strategy and the
relevant key financial metrics used to guide Ford Motor Credit
Company to continuously strengthening its balance sheet.
(5) Review Ford Motor Credit Company’s funding and liquidity
strategies and the relevant metrics used to ensure diversification
and achievement of yearly funding objectives.
(6) Review the Company’s capital strategies from rating agency
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and investor perspectives.
(7) Review the Company’s capital appropriations financial
performance against targets by conducting interim reviews and
an annual review of previously approved capital programs, and
periodic review of acquisitions and new business investments.
(8) Review and approve recommendations to the Board in all
significant areas of the Company’s capital strategy.
Treasury and Tax Matters
(9) Review with Company management, at least annually, the
Annual Report from the Treasurer of the Company’s cash and
funding plans and other Treasury matters.
(10) Review with Company management, at least annually, the
Company’s health care costs and plans for funding such costs.
(11) Review with Company management, at least annually, the
Company’s pension strategy and performance.
(12) Review, at least annually, policies with respect to financial
risk assessment and financial risk management.
(13) Review any significant financial exposures and contingent
liabilities of the Company, including foreign exchange, interest
rate, and commodities exposures and the use of derivatives to
hedge those risks.
(14) Review with management the financial aspects of insurance
programs.
(15) Review with Company management, at least annually, the
Company’s tax strategy.
(16) Review and approve recommendations to the Board in all
significant areas of the Company’s Treasury and Tax matters.
Reports
(17) Report regularly to the Board (i) following meetings of the
Finance Committee, (ii) with respect to such other matters as are
relevant to the Finance Committee’s discharge of its
responsibilities and (iii) with respect to such recommendations as
the Finance Committee may deem appropriate. The report to the
Board may take the form of an oral report by the Chair or any
other member of the Finance Committee designated by the
Finance Committee to make such report.
Other Matters
(18) The Finance Committee shall perform a review and
evaluation, at least annually, of the performance of the Finance
Committee and its members, including a review of adherence of
the Finance Committee to this Charter. In addition, the Finance
Committee shall review and reassess, at least annually, the
adequacy of this Charter and recommend to the Nominating and
Governance Committee any improvements to this Charter that
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the Finance Committee considers necessary or appropriate. The
Finance Committee shall conduct such evaluation and reviews in
such manner as it deems appropriate.
(19) Perform any other activities consistent with this Charter,
the By-Laws of the Company and other applicable law, rules or
regulations as the Finance Committee or the Board deems
necessary or appropriate.

C. Risk Committee
During 2020, when describing the risk oversight role for
every board, consultant PwC writes it “is a critical one. It can
bring real value to a company and its shareholders both in
times of crisis, and when it’s just business as usual. It starts
with understanding the strategic direction of the company,
considering the broader stakeholder perspectives, and
having an effective oversight function . . . .” 64
D. Investment Committee
NACD reports that only 4.2% of Russell 3000 Index
companies report having an “investment” committee during
2018. 65 An example of the Progressive Corporation
Investment and Capital Corporation is found at Exhibit 7.

64. See PWC, RISK OVERSIGHT AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: NAVIGATING A
COMPLEX, EVOLVING AREA 1 (Dec. 2020), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/governanceinsights-center/publications/assets/pwc-risk-oversight-and-the-boardnavigating-a-complex-evolving-area.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2YY-NNXL].
65. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 8 (2019).
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The Progressive Corporation Investment and
Capital Committee Charter 66

Organization
The Investment and Capital Committee (Committee), appointed
by the Board of Directors (Board) of The Progressive Corporation
(Company), shall consist of at least three directors including the
Chairperson. The Chairperson shall be independent of the
management of the Company (as defined by the listing standards of
the New York Stock Exchange) and free of any relationship that, in
the opinion of the Board, would interfere with his or her exercise of
independent judgment as a Committee member. The Chief
Executive Officer may be a member of the Committee. Each
member of the Committee shall be financially literate.
Statement of Purpose
The Committee shall, through regular or special meetings with
management, assist the Board in monitoring (1) whether the
Company has adopted and adheres to a rational and prudent
investment and capital management policy, (2) whether
management’s investment and capital management actions are
consistent with attainment of the Company’s investment policy,
financial objectives and business goals, (3) the Company’s
compliance with legal and regulatory requirements pertaining to
investment and capital management, (4) the competence,
performance, and compensation of the Company’s internal and
external money managers, and (5) such other matters as the Board
or Committee deems appropriate.
It is not the duty of the Committee to make operating decisions
about money manager selection or compensation, asset allocation,
market timing, sector rotation, or security selection. These are
responsibilities of management. The Board must approve
significant changes to the Company’s capital structure, investment
policy and dividend policy.
The Committee, in its discretion, shall have the authority to
retain legal counsel or consultants to advise the Committee. The
Committee may request any officer or employee of the Company or
any of the Company’s outside money managers or advisers to attend
a meeting of, or to meet in executive session with, the Committee or
to meet with any member of, or consultants to, the Committee.
The Board’s Audit Committee is responsible for determining

66. PROGRESSIVE CORP., INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL COMMITTEE CHARTER,
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/IROL/81/81824/Investment%20and%
20Capital%20Committee%20Charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/AFB5-PNCZ] (last
viewed Nov. 24, 2021).
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whether there is an appropriate segregation of duties between
decision making, investment accounting and performance
measurement.
The Board’s Compensation Committee is responsible for
approving compensation plans for the Company’s senior investment
staff. The Compensation Committee will consider the counsel of the
Investment and Capital Committee before making such a decision.
The Investment and Capital Committee shall make regular
reports to the Board on the Committee’s activities.
Responsibilities of the Investment and Capital Committee
The Committee shall:
1. At least annually, review the continued adequacy of this
Investment and Capital Committee Charter and recommend any
changes to the Board for approval.
2. Review and recommend to the Board for approval the
Company’s clearly articulated Investment Policy, which specifies
asset allocation and money management guidelines that provide
reasonable assurance that the Company can meet its business
and financial objectives with a reasoned balance between risk,
return and cost. The over-riding constraints are to maintain the
ability to meet any foreseeable financial obligation in a timely
manner, support growth, and allow the Company to meet its
financial goals.
3. Determine that investment guidelines are consistent with the
Investment Policy, clearly defined, properly measured, and
consistently followed and that procedures are in place to ensure
that the investment portfolio is managed in a manner consistent
with the Investment Policy and applicable investment guidelines.
4. Determine that the Company has a clearly articulated capital
plan for capital structure, dividend policy, and share repurchases
that considers future growth plans, business and financial risks,
and financial and regulatory constraints.
5. Ensure that roles and responsibilities are clearly established
for the Chief Investment Officer, internal and external money
managers, and Treasurer.
6. Contribute to the evaluation of the qualifications and
performance of the Company’s Chief Investment Officer and
Treasurer and provide feedback to the Chief Financial Officer
and Chief Executive Officer.
7. Ensure that management reviews portfolio performance
against objectives and assesses the performance of the
Company’s investment staff and outside investment advisers,
and, as necessary, takes corrective action.
8. Ensure that systems and procedures are in place to inform the
Company’s investment staff of applicable state and federal legal
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and regulatory requirements, to monitor compliance with those
requirements, and to report and take remedial action in the event
of any deviations therefrom.
9. Confirm that the Company has in place a policy which
prohibits its investment personnel from misappropriating for
their own benefit investment opportunities that are made
available to the Company, and from knowingly trading or taking
a position in any security in advance of the Company’s planned
execution of a trade in that security or taking any other action
that may frustrate or undermine the investment strategy or
plans of the Company.
10. Determine that policies and procedures are in place to help
ensure that members of the Company’s investment staff do not
trade any security while in possession of material inside
information regarding the issuer thereof in violation of the
federal securities laws.
11. Determine that share repurchases by the Company are
executed pursuant to a program that has been reviewed by legal
counsel to ensure that the applicable legal requirements have
been satisfied, including compliance with, as applicable, issuer
tender offer rules, insider trading laws, Regulation M (which
prohibits repurchases during a distribution of Investment and
Capital Committee Charter securities) and the requirements of
SEC’s Rule 10b-18 promulgated under the Securities Act of 1934.
12. Determine that procedures are in place to ensure that any
offer or sale by the Company of any of its debt or equity securities
is made in compliance with applicable federal and state securities
laws.
Communications with the Investment and Capital
Committee
The Committee makes known to management and associates of
the Company that the Investment and Capital Committee desires
direct communication from them regarding concerns or issues
related to the Committee’s Charter. The Committee expects
management to advise it promptly of any significant investmentrelated operational or accounting issues that vary from traditional
practices, Progressive’s investment policy or Progressive’s
investment constraints. The Chief Investment Officer and the
Treasurer will have direct access to the Committee.
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E. Technology Committee
PwC reports, “Many directors are not confident that
management has a handle on cyber threats.” 67 As shown in
PwC’s 2017 Annual Corporate Directors Survey, “only 39%
of directors are very comfortable that their company has
identified its most valuable and sensitive assets.” 68 A year
later, “44% of the 9,500 executives surveyed . . . say they
don’t have an overall information security strategy.” 69 Given
the growing risk and expense of cyber breach, consultant
PWC states, “boards recognize the need for an effective cyber
risk governance and oversight structure. Such a structure
includes the board, IT and management so cyber risks are
managed across the company.” 70 Although this task will
likely require time and top leadership commitment to
achieve “such a cyber risk management program, the end
goal is to have a cost-effective program that addresses the
key risks, and allows the company to become cyber
resilient.” 71 In their 2018 Annual Corporate Directors
Survey, PWC reports that responsibility for cybersecurity
declined for audit committees between 2017 (50% of
companies used the audit committee for this purpose) and
2018 (43%). 72 During the same time period, cyber
responsibility being handled at the full board rose from 30%
to 36%, with a designated “Risk” committee utilized among
67. Paula Loop, Catherine Bromilow & Sean Joyce, Overseeing Cyber Risk,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 18, 2018), https://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2018/02/18/overseeing-cyber-risk/.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing PWC, STRENGTHENING DIGITAL SOCIETY AGAINST CYBER SHOCKS:
KEY FINDINGS FROM THE GLOBAL STATE OF INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY 2018
(2017), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/cybersecurity/assets/pwc-2018-gsiss-strength
ening-digital-society-against-cyber-shocks.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X4L-X6PY]).
70. See PWC, HOW YOUR BOARD CAN BETTER OVERSEE CYBER RISK 9 (Nov.
2018), https://www.pwc.dk/da/publikationer/2018/pwc-how-your-board-can-bet
ter-oversee-cyber-risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/B48N-SC55].
71. Id.
72. Id. at 5.
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12% of companies reporting, and 4% relying on an “IT/digital
committee.” 73
F. Strategy Committee
Although only two (2%) percent of Russell 3000 Index
companies report during 2020 to have committees actually
bearing the name “strategy,” 74 “sixty-eight percent of
responding directors report that their company can no longer
count on extending its historical strategy over the next five
years. Future growth will likely depend on the adoption of a
different business model and an entirely new set of
assumptions about what success will look like.” 75 In addition,
NACD discloses, “Directors identify growing business-model
disruptions (52%) and a slowing global economy (51%) as the
top trends most likely to impact their organization over the
next 12 months.” 76 More than forty years ago:
Texas Instruments had a standing Strategic Planning committee of
the board. Texas Instruments at that time was very homogeneous,
with almost every member having an engineering background. The
TI Strategic Planning Committee was chaired by lawyer Bryan
Smith, Chancellor of the Texas University System and veteran
director of numerous major boards. [Forty] years later, few standing
board strategic planning committees are to be found, perhaps a
testament of how hard this function is to institutionalize at the
board level. 77

73. Id.
74. NAT’L ASS’N
(2020).

OF

CORP. DIRS., INSIDE

THE

PUBLIC COMPANY BOARDROOM 10

75. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 6 (2019).
76. Id.
77. See Trautman, Matrix, supra note 26, at 118.
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G. Other Committees
Other lesser utilized titles for board committees include:
“compliance committee” (NACD documents use in about
3.5% of reporting companies), 78 and “environment, health,
and safety committee” (reported by 3% of companies). 79
During 2020, the following committee names were found
among about one percent or less of Russell 3000 boards:
research and development, public policy, corporate
responsibility,
acquisition,
plan,
cybersecurity,
sustainability, special activities, loan; stock award, asset and
liability, and capital. 80 Others, “having governance issues
unique to their situation will have a committee structure
reflecting these specific concerns. Examples . . . include the
“nuclear oversight” committee and subcommittee of utility
NRG, or the “reserve valuation committee” at oil and gas
producer[s] . . . .” 81
IX. GOVERNING CYBER RISKS
News reports continue to demonstrate the significant
threats
to
global
data
systems. 82
Technological
advancements create an ever-growing opportunity for
malicious actors to gain access to the data systems and
personal information of others. Cyber risk continues to be
among the greatest threats to governments, business
entities, and individuals worldwide. 83 For those engaged in
78. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 8 (2019).
79. Id.
80. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., INSIDE THE PUBLIC COMPANY BOARDROOM
25 (2020) (Nonstandard Committee Data).
81. See Trautman, Matrix, supra note 26, at 90 (citing Board of Directors,
NRG, https://investors.nrg.com/corporate-governance/board-of-directors (last
visited Nov. 24, 2021)).
82. David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth & Julien E. Barnes, Scope of Russian
Hacking Far Exceeds Initial Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2021, at A1.
83. Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber
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corporate governance, cyber security is one of every board’s
greatest challenges. 84
Professor Frederick R. Chang brings a unique
perspective to our understanding of cyber threat. His career
spans service in the private sector and in government
including as the former Director of Research at the National
Security Agency (NSA). He is currently the Co-Chair of the
Intelligence Community Studies Board of the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and he is
also a member of the Army Research Laboratory Technical
Assessment Board of the National Academies. He has served:
as a member of the Computer Science and
Telecommunications Board of the National Academies; as a
member of the Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th
Presidency; and has appeared before Congress as a
cybersecurity expert witness on multiple occasions. Professor
Chang warns:
Basically what directors need to know about cyber is that it is a
strategic risk and not just an IT thing. It’s easy to think of it as if,
there are some routers or some switches or some firewalls that get
broken, resulting in exposed data—creating a problem. It’s
important to step back and reflect upon how cyber is a risk, like any
other risk. It can be thought of like an earthquake, or a flood or a
fire. Much like an earthquake, flood, or fire — you can’t do anything
about it if there’s going to be an earthquake, and you are located in
California. You can’t stop the earthquake. All too often, it seems,
there is a perception that cyber threat can actually be stopped. It
can’t be stopped. If a persistent attacker has a really high desire to
break through, then they’re going to get through. You can’t stop
them—and cyber has to be viewed as a risk, like any other risk[.]
. . . [T]here are some things you can do to mitigate . . . the risk, but
you can’t eliminate the risk. Maybe you can buy insurance, you can
Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Stuxnet and the Internet of Things, 72 U. MIA. L.
REV. 761, 763 (2018).
84. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and
Officers’ Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L.
REV. 1231, 1234–35 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman, How Law Operates in a
Wired Global Society: Cyber and E-Commerce Risk, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3033776 (prepared for the Korea Legislation Research
Institute (KLRI), 2017 Legal Scholar Roundtable, Seoul, Korea, Sept. 21–22,
2017).
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bring in some more people to work on cybersecurity, and so forth.
But cyber threat is fundamentally something you can’t stop, and it
needs to be viewed at that level. So, what steps does a board take to
have enough intrinsic knowledge about cyber? The task can be a
highly technical thing, but it isn’t only a technical concern.

A. Pandemic Impact of Cyber Security
Professor Frederick R. Chang observes, “During this
pandemic, cyber intrusions have increased dramatically.
Just because everybody’s online so much, including the shift
toward employees working from home. A board has to decide
whether there is enough cyber talent on the board, just to
understand the complexity of issues.”
Based on 416 surveyed directors, NACD found: 44
percent of companies conduct cybersecurity oversight
primarily at the full board level; 41 percent within the audit
committee; 10 percent in their risk committee; and 5 percent
(other). 85 Cyber expert Frederick R. Chang states:
Another issue worth mentioning here relates to the legal
consequences of cyber and data privacy issues. Depending on the
company’s domicile and where business is being conducted—if in
Texas, or if it’s in California, or it’s in New York – jurisdictions have
different laws about disclosure. So, if you get breached, it turns out
there are numerous different disclosure laws that a company must
comply with. And legislation is constantly changing these
requirements. It’s really important that directors understand the
legal consequences of a cyber breach in their company, in their
state, in their industry. Consequences are different in the
healthcare industry, different in retail, different in finance, and it’s
different in education. So, it’s really important that directors
understand the legal environment in which they are operating. 86

85. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 2019–
2020, at 20 (2019).
86. See David D. Schein & Lawrence J. Trautman, The Dark Web and
Employer Liability, 18 COLO. TECH. L.J. 49, 76–78 (2020); Lawrence J. Trautman,
Tony Luppino & Malika Simmons, Some Key Things U.S. Entrepreneurs Need to
Know About the Law and Lawyers, 46 TEX. J. BUS. L. 155, 161–66 (2016);
Lawrence J. Trautman, Kenneth J. Sanney, Eric D. Yordy, Tammy W. Cowart &
Destynie J. L. Sewell, Teaching Ethics and Values in an Age of Rapid
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“In my experience, I have seen cyber risk handled a
couple of different ways,” says director Ron McCray. He
continues:
I serve on the board and on the audit committee of a major research
university. Imagine the kind of exposure that university could have
. . . . We have a subcommittee of the audit committee that’s focused
on cyber security and it’s populated with trustees who have
functional executive experience in the cyberspace. At another
company board on which I serve . . . . we don’t have a cyber security
expert. Without board cyber security expertise, what we do have is
a regular dialogue with the chief technology officer. And so, we
manage the risk by giving keen oversight over what that CTO is
seeing . . . and to the extent he or she can identify risk, we monitor
what they’re doing about managing, mitigating, or eliminating it.

“I agree with what . . . you are saying, . . . [and] in my
experience, my boards have put the cyber oversight role in
the audit committee and that’s because that’s where we’re
dealing with all things that involve risk,” says director
Michele Hooper. She adds:
Most of my boards do not have a specific risk committee which
tends to be found in finance or insurance type companies, as
opposed to other industries. So, one of the things that I view as our
keen responsibility is to listen, understand, and make sure that
there’s mitigation and other attention being given alongside with
outside benchmarking. But to me, one of my primary
responsibilities is to make sure that the cyber teams have enough
resources to do the job in today’s world. Part of the problem is that
in many organizations the budget within the cyber and the
information area has been increasing enormously. And part of our
responsibility on the audit committee and full board is protecting
the employees that are in cyber functions and ensuring that
management provides the attention and the resources that are
needed.
It is important that boards explore bringing an individual with
cyber experience on to the board. However, in the absence of such
cyber talent, one of the ways in which we manage is to have outside
experts that come into the boardroom and talk to us. And one of the
Technological Change, 17 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 17 (2021) (discussing ethical and
legal issues); Lawrence J. Trautman, Governance of the Facebook Privacy Crisis,
20 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 41 (2020); Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google
Perceives Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-Commerce, Political and Regulatory
Compliance Risks, 10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2018).
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reasons that we tend to do it that way is that we found that cyber
developments and the risks around cyber change so much. We found
that if we brought somebody who’s retired, their knowledge goes
stale very quickly. And so that’s how we tend to handle it. The other
pandemic development is that the business environment is going
virtual. As a result, ransomware is an area that is exploding in
terms of risk—and boards need to be aware and focused on
ransomware. 87

“In my last CEO job, I elevated the chief technology
officer (CTO) to my leadership team,” says director Ron
McCray. He continues:
We wanted all of the operating executives to have visibility into
what the data function team was seeing around the company—and
therefore, to have detailed insight into what all the operators were
living. When we had board meetings, all of my leadership team joins
me . . . . Therefore, we have a natural opportunity to elevate cyber
security issues in the audit committee and among the full board. In
addition, this format allows for the directors, the CTO and I as CEO,
to all engage productively on the topic and to better identify the
risks.

“Michele Hooper brings up a good point about budgets,”
says cyber expert Frederick R. Chang. He further states:
I talk with plenty of chief information security officers (CISOs)
where they say, ‘The board has given me, lots of money to protect
against a cyber breach. But, I don’t have the people to spend all the
money or I don’t have all the talent to spend all the money so . . . I
can’t protect everything, even if you gave me five times the budget.
I just can’t do it . . . don’t have the time. There aren’t enough hours
in the day.’

There should be an expectation that board members
have of management—about having an analytical
framework (dashboard) in which to measure risk. So,
87. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware,
and the Emerging Threat to Corporations, 86 TENN. L. REV. 503, 506 (2019);
Lawrence J. Trautman, Mohammed T. Hussein, Emmanuel U. Opara, Mason J.
Molesky & Shahedur Rahman, Posted: No Phishing, 8 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE
& ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 39, 41–42 (2021) (discussing ransomware threats);
Lawrence J. Trautman, Mohammed T. Hussein, Louis Ngamassi & Mason J.
Molesky, Governance of The Internet of Things (IoT), 60 JURIMETRICS 315, 319–
20 (2020) (discussing ransomware common threat vectors).
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companies should ascribe a measurable risk of a weather
event, a power loss event, a cyber event, or other event—and
provide contingency plans for each. A gameplan must exist
ahead of time to decide steps to be taken in the event of a
cyber breach, weather risk, a power outage, etc. This
discipline provides a framework to help decide what
resources are dedicated toward the different risks. This
allows management to have a framework to analyze these
threats. 88
Director Trautman observes, “For years now, something
I hear in boardrooms is, ‘Even if we spend every dollar we
could borrow. We still wouldn’t have spent enough on cyber.
The North Koreans, Russians, Chinese . . . all these nations
are engaged in cyber war. We don’t have enough money
around here to fight a war.’” As a result, many boards are
just pushing the problem off on the government, on others,
on their customers and there are few prosecutions, because
cyber failures are so pervasive . . . because everybody’s got
the same problem.” 89
While time prohibits a full discussion here, Trautman
88. See Fred Chang, Opinion, Sputnik Offers a Lesson on Cybersecurity
Workforce,
DALL. MORNING NEWS
(Oct.
3,
2017,
12:25
PM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2017/10/03/sputnik-offers-alesson-on-cybersecurity-workforce/ (discussing cyber workforce shortage); see
also Mohammed Hussein, Lawrence J. Trautman & Reginald Holloway,
Technology Employment, Information and Communication in the Digital Age
(Jan. 13, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3762273
(discussing information technology/cybersecurity employment opportunities).
89. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack The Next Pearl Harbor?, 18
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 232, 257 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing
Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 230, 232 (2016); Lawrence J.
Trautman, Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who and How It Works,
5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 147, 149 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity:
What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 341, 344 (2015);
Lawrence J. Trautman, Impeachment, Donald Trump and The Attempted
Extortion of Ukraine, 40 PACE L. REV. 141, 198–99 (2020) (discusses nation state
active measures taken against U.S. elections); Lawrence J. Trautman,
Presidential Impeachment: A Contemporary Analysis, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 529,
568 (2019); Lawrence J. Trautman, Democracy At Risk: Domestic Terrorism and
Attack on the U.S. Capitol, 45 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming)
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3808365.
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also cautions, “Boards are always trying to manage what we
know about . . . but it is those developments just barely
visible, like the impact of quantum computing and other
technological advancements that we don’t yet fully
understand that require thoughtful consideration.” 90
Professor Frederick R. Chang warns:
Cyber is one of these asymmetric attacks where directors can
provide corporate cyber defenders with a big check, but, for a
relatively small amount of money, an attacker can successfully get
through defenses. So, while the defender has to defend a bunch of
different positions, all the attacker has to do is find a way through
one position, . . . one port, or one human clicking on a link that they
shouldn’t. Therefore, these situations are very difficult because an
attacker doesn’t have to spend too much in resources to do
considerable damage, while the defender has spent a lot of money
to create a fortress that is unfortunately, ultimately compromised.
This is why these attacks are referred to as asymmetric.

Director Ron McCray observes, “Most companies
probably have some sort of redundancy defense deployed, so
that if they are hit by something from cyberspace, data
systems are backed-up and easily recoverable. Every
enterprise must have the ability to get up and running from
somewhere else.” Professor Chang adds, “There are plenty of
examples of corporations that have moved some data
operations from one part of the country to another part of the
country for both cost and redundancy reasons.”

90. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies, and the Struggle
of Law and Regulation to Keep Pace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447, 449 (2018); Lawrence
J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, A Primer for Blockchain, 88 UMKC L. REV.
239 (2019); Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin C. Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated
Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1050 (2017); Lawrence
J. Trautman, E-Commerce, Cyber, and Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons
from PayPal, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J 261, 299 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is
Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial Services?, 69
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 232, 234 (2016); Lawrence Trautman, Virtual
Currencies; Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?,
20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13, at 2 (2014); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara
Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology
Governance, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 313, 315–17 (2011).
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X. DIRECTORS IN CRISIS
A. Importance of a Crisis Game Plan
Seasoned directors recognize “that a clear strategy and
implementation plan for reasonably foreseeable industry
disasters—before they take place—helps to prevent mistakes
made under conditions of severe stress.” 91 “I found it useful
in every company where I’ve served to have a crisis
management manual,” says director Ron McCray. Consider:
This manual delineates principal risks that might attend to the
enterprise. And it gives management, a rough outline or map of how
they should think about managing those risks. And every once in
awhile, like you would with a fire risk, you have a fire-like drill to
test drive the crisis management manual. This is one way that I
have found effective to assure that through regular crisis ‘fire drills’
acquaintance with the risk management framework that we
develop for crisis management is reinforced.

B. 2008 Financial Meltdown and 2020-2021 Challenges
Elsewhere, Professor Trautman has written, “The seeds
for the 2007-09 financial collapse were sewn over many years
and nurtured by ill-advised governmental housing policy, the
presence of pervasive fraud both large and small and the
widespread failure of personal integrity.” 92 This crisis
resulted in pervasive job loss, widespread corporate failures,
and a call to action under severe stress for almost every
corporate board. Throughout history, financial crises occur
all too frequently. As such, these events are foreseeable, and
require detailed anticipatory planning. Much like the year91. Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis Governance,
13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 275, 275 (2017); see also Marianne Jennings & Lawrence
J. Trautman, Ethical Culture and Legal Liability: The GM Switch Crisis and
Lessons in Governance, 22 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 187, 228–29 (2016).
92. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Personal Ethics & the U.S. Financial Collapse
of 2007-08: Decade Later After-Action Report 1 (Aug. 12, 2017), https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2502124.
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2000-era corporate frauds resulted in Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation, 93 the financial crisis of 2008 resulted in DoddFrank legislation. 94
C. Pandemics
The pandemic of 2020-21 illustrates the critical role
played by corporate directors during times of crisis. Global
developments during this tragic time have brought
tremendous stress to all institutions in our society. Many
corporate directors have been required to preside over
survival scenarios for their businesses. Job loss, rent and
food insecurity, particularly for many of the least fortunate
among us has resulted from this worldwide tragedy. 95
Almost no board has escaped impact from the crisis created
by this pandemic.
Many industries have been severely impacted by the
pandemic. Just one example is the transportation sector,
such as airlines. Also, those companies operating in the
hospitality space have a similar problem, along with many
in-person entertainment companies. Michele Hooper says:
I am on an airline board and I’m also on the United Health Group
board, a health care board. So, I’m right in the thick of this
pandemic. Part of the responsibilities that we have as directors is
that we have an oversight role. We are not management.
Management is responsible for understanding the company’s
immediate situation and coming up with plans, making day-to-day
decisions, bringing those strategy recommendations to the board,
making sure that the board understands what is going on and has
ability to provide input and direction. On my airline board, as I’m
sure you can imagine, as this pandemic unfolded, we had telephonic
board meetings once or twice a week. This schedule became normal
93. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28
U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
94. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. Law
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
95. Eddie Bernice Johnson & Lawrence J. Trautman, The Demographics of
Death: An Early Look at Covid-19, Cultural and Racial Bias in America, 48
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357, 374 (2021).
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procedure until the middle of September 2020, and then we went to
just the normal schedule for board meetings and other things that
developed so we have been in the thick of things, but the actual
responsibility for making those day-to-day plans for decision
making falls on management. Airlines are a regulated industry—
requiring, working with the government, working with those
regulators and the other peers that we have so that we provide a
united front from an industry perspective.
As a director, along with my peers, we have responsibility for
understanding the company’s situation—then, weighing in helping
to understand our actions, because this pandemic has been very,
very expensive to corporate entities, but also very costly to our
employees. Our airline industry is now a mere fraction of our former
selves. We probably had to let go, either through voluntary or
involuntary separation, almost 40,000 people. So it has been a
horrific event, but what has happened requires transparency and
insistence upon openness. Directors have a duty to make sure that
the board and management inquires and understands the informed
overview of all those issues impacting the company. In addition, it
is my belief that it is important that we are open, honest, and
transparent to the employee base. It’s important that our employees
and regulators know what we know—so, we’re all in this together.
And I think that’s really the only way that we’re going to have the
most positive result on the other side of this tragedy.

“Another thing that we learned during the past few
months is the destructive impact the pandemic has had on
the sub-supply chains,” says Ron McCray. He explains that
companies are having a tougher time depending on the industry
sourcing materials or getting a product to market. This required
focus on the supply chain has made us think about how we organize
for the future, what we are learning and can glean from this crisis,
so that when we get on the other side of this crisis, we will be
smarter. As painful as this pandemic experience has been, it
appears that one or more green shoots of insight are emerging . . .
about how we might go to market differently during the future, or
how we might use office space differently, for instance—and how we
might source material differently. So that during the future, we are
positioned where we are more efficient or effective with procedures
in place.

“Yes, today, there’s a lot of discussion taking place in
companies about process changes conducted now . . . and as
we are working our way through this pandemic,” states
Michele Hooper. This discussion includes
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which of these process improvements we will want to keep. So,
through time, some of what we are currently doing will fall by the
wayside. But there’s learning taking place . . . about how we do
business, who we do business with, what processes are improved,
the speed to market that will remain when the pandemic is over.
We found that there is an incredible ability to turn around
organizations on a dime. And to add to the credit of most
organizations, their ability to change the way in which they do
business and to have their employees, change the way they do
business. It’s been remarkable and has really shown us a side of
how we conduct ourselves . . . and a capability that I don’t think
most companies realized they had.

D. Tropical Storms
The dramatic increase in severe weather during recent
years is yet another wakeup call for humanity to take these
warnings from science very seriously. During the fall of 2020,
many students in the Houston area found themselves
required to deal with disruptions caused by three different
tropical storms within just a few months. Then, in February
2021, freezing temperatures result in frozen pipes, severe
loss of electrical power and water for millions of Texan
residents. 96
XI. FOCUS ON DIVERSITY
The lack of diversity on corporate boards remains a longstanding problem with little dramatic progress having been
made. 97 Director Michele Hooper observes,
Corporate directors find themselves in ‘sort of a foxhole,’ and the
question becomes, who do you want to have in the foxhole with you.”
I will tell you, there are minorities, people of Color, and others that
are equally as talented, each having credentials and experience that
would enable them to serve on those boards—and be able to perform
not only adequately, but in a superior way. I went on my first board
96. Brad Plumer, Frigid Onslaught Stretches Limits of Electrical Grids, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2021, at A1; Jack Healy, Richard Fausset & James Dobbins,
Texans Facing New Crisis: Too Little Drinkable Water, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2021,
at A1.
97. See Trautman, Diversity, supra note 25, at 237.
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at the age of tender age of 38, . . . but at 38 . . . I did not have a lot
of actual experience compared with starting board service when I
was 55, which a lot of people do. But, upon reflection, during those
early assignments, I would rank my experience and my ability to
make sound judgments as strong as two-thirds of the guys with
whom I served. Through my career in the nominating/governance
chair role, . . . I’ve been recruiting people for a long time and have
brought people onto other boards. While my experience seems to be
better than two-thirds of the guys with whom I serve—recruitment
appears to be based more about who you know, than a matter of
being concerned about whether or not that you’re bringing on people
that have the appropriate or superior credentials. It is, I think, more
a matter of bringing on people in your circle. People that look like
you, people that you’re comfortable with, and people that go to the
same clubs, go to the same private lunch organizations. It appears
to me that recruitment of minorities suffers from a fear of the
unknown, or a bias more likely against the unknown.

“Michele, I agree with you. It seems people want other
directors to be individuals who are their friends and
colleagues, with very similar tastes and very similar
approaches,” says Director and University President Ruth
Simmons. She adds:
And, they just don’t want to have to deal with people who are
different in the boardroom. . . . They want a known quantity. So,
trying to get someone untested onto a major board is very hard to
do. Now, it’s important to say that CEOs have a very important role
in recruiting directors. Sometimes CEOs can lean into this and
influence directors to bring on people who don’t fit that mold. It’s
very hard for a single director to do that, no matter how qualified.
This reluctance to change appears to me to be one of the shocking
elements of corporate culture. . . . The aperture is so narrow now for
getting onto a corporate board. As an example, I never imagined
myself wanting to be on a corporate board. Frankly, I had no
interest whatsoever. But, when I was president of Smith, the CEO
of Metropolitan Life was also a trustee of Smith, and he asked me
to join their board. I didn’t want to. So, I told board members that I
was not inclined to do it. But, the board wanted me to do it. That’s
how I ended up taking on my first board. It was through someone
that I actually knew. Someone I know recently conducted a survey
of black directors, and they concluded that this is the experience of
most blacks who serve on major corporate boards—they get on those
boards because they knew someone who got them nominated. So,
it’s frankly shocking that in this day and age, the processes are not
more open. However, the environment may be more conducive now
to welcoming peoples of color onto major boards because of the
recent focus on diversity and inclusion. But, this remains one of the
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sorry stories related to corporations: . . . the lack of leadership on
corporate boards dedicated to the concept of diversity.

“To your point about getting recruited, . . . you get on a
board because of who you know. . . . This is the case for
everybody, . . . [and] how 75 to 80% of people go onto boards,”
says Michele Hooper. She further states,
It’s because of who they know . . . and they are recruited by
somebody on the board. So that’s just the way it is, unfortunately.
However, it seems that we are in a moment here. Because of the
tragic George Floyd murder, we are in a moment for African
Americans in particular, and people of Color. . . . It has focused the
mind and the attention of corporations and boards. There are
several initiatives that are specifically looking at recruiting an
additional director who is African American specifically . . . or a
person of Color. A number of boards and nominating and
governance committees are focused toward recruiting African
Americans and recruiting African American women, who comprise
a very, very sorry percentage of our boards of directors, . . . but we
are in a moment. I don’t think that this is a new wave, nor that it is
going to go on ad infinitum. It’s probably a window lasting just a
couple of years. I’m afraid this moment will go out of fashion again
and we’ll be, unfortunately, back into having the same conversation.
But we’re in a moment at present. We need to seize this opportunity
with both hands.

“To be candid, the discussion around the boardroom and
around the nominating / governance committee is often
tragically biased,” adds Ruth Simmons. She adds,
There are very prominent African Americans in this country who
have the required financial knowledge, who have the contacts, who
have enough of the education needed in all areas to be wonderful
corporate directors. I’ve repeatedly heard boards pass on candidates
because the minority candidates: may be too ‘controversial’; they
may be too ‘outspoken’; or they may be too ‘full of themselves.’ And
so, it’s just that kind of thing that you hear repeatedly in
boardrooms in passing overqualified individuals, particularly
outspoken, intelligent, capable candidates . . . who are women
and/or minorities. And the idea is, ‘we don’t want all that noise in
the boardroom.’ We just want somebody who is going to be like us;
it’s very discouraging.

Professor Seletha Butler, having written extensively
about the topic of board diversity says, “I think it’s a lot about
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the network that potential directors have and those
individuals being tapped by various individuals in the
decision making platform that has the ability to advocate for
them. So, I agree with everything that has been said.” 98
Director Trautman adds:
We’ve been talking about the National Association of Corporate
Directors, and I recall a number of years ago in New York sitting
next to the Chairman of one of the largest feminine hygiene
companies in the world. I remember saying to him [name omitted],
“Let me get this straight, you don’t have any women who have ever
used your product on the board?” “No,” he replied, “but we’ve got
some doctors.” So, if your company is doing business in India, for
example, or some other culture is a major part of where you sell
your product, and you have neither women nor anybody who
understands the cultural differences involved marketing such a
product in that environment, it is only common sense to improve
your decision-making process. It just shows you how stupid as a
culture and society we’ve been for a long time.

A. Recent Developments
Elsewhere, Professors Gow, Larcker, and Watts
“investigate one important influence on diversity by studying
whether shareholders value diversity on corporate boards in
director elections. Using a broad sample of director elections
from 2003 through 2018, [the authors] provide robust
evidence that shareholders value diversity.” 99 They explain
that

98. See also Seletha R. Butler, All on Board! Strategies for Constructing
Diverse Boards of Directors, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 61, 65–67 (2012). See generally
Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of
the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795;
Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women,
People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1105 (2005); Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New
Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855 (2011).
99. Ian D. Gow, David F. Larcker & Edward M. Watts, Board Diversity and
Shareholder Voting 5–6 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ.
Working Paper No. 245, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3733054.
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the magnitude of these effects is heavily dependent on the type of
diversity. Our findings suggest that while both the race or ethnicity
and gender of candidates are important factors in the shareholder
voting process, shareholders have historically been more likely to
support gender diverse candidates than racially or ethnically
diverse candidates. We also provide evidence that shareholders
place significantly more value on boards’ overall diversity rather
than the diversity of individual candidates. Finally, the magnitude
of the additional voting support for diverse candidates and boards
has grown significantly over time, and there is considerable
heterogeneity in voting behavior across shareholders along several
important dimensions (e.g., the Big Three asset managers). 100

CONCLUSION
While our discussion inevitably fails to resolve the
ongoing debate regarding the full scope of corporate purpose,
we believe our comments and observations add to the
necessary and important continuing discussion about the
efficient functioning of directors as they seek to discharge our
duties and responsibilities, particularly with regard to
governing cybersecurity risk and issues of board diversity.

100. Id.

